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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the application of international humanitarian law to the
international armed conflict that took place in Afghanistan starting in October 2001. It
examines the Unites States’ right to use force in self-defense against Afghanistan in
retaliation for the 11 September 2001 incidents that involved the destruction of the
twin towers in New York and damaged the Pentagon in Washington D.C. It further
evaluates whether the United States and the de facto government of Afghanistan, the
Taliban, committed violations of international law. Finally, the thesis identifies the
possible remedies to which States may have recourse when they commit
internationally wrongful acts, including violations of international humanitarian law,
by among other alternatives, briefly examining the prospects for action by the
International Criminal Court in such situations.
The thesis argues and proves the following: the United States was not justified in
using force as self-defense against Afghanistan (based on the evidence available);
Afghanistan’s use of force in self-defense against the United States and its allies was
justified; international humanitarian law applies regardless of whether the use of force
was legitimate or not; the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other customary norms
apply to this armed conflict; indiscriminate attacks and the treatment of prisoners of
war by the United States, and placing civilians near military targets and taking over
hospitals for military purposes by the Taliban, violated norms of international
humanitarian law; and finally remedies for violations of international law (use of
force) and international humanitarian law are applicable.
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INTRODUCTION

A brief chronological account of the events that led to the conflict in Afghanistan
provides the factual background for this thesis. On 11 September 2001, the United
States was an object of attack when four planes were hijacked simultaneously. Two
planes crashed into the World Trade Center; one into the Pentagon, and another into a
field in Western Pennsylvania, although the last was alleged to have been heading
towards Washington D.C. Following the attacks, the United States thought that alQaida, and specifically Osama Bin Laden, were responsible for planning the attacks.
At that time, the Taliban government of Afghanistan was hosting al-Qaida. When the
United States requested the de facto government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, to
extradite Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban responded by requesting the United States
provide proof of his involvement in the 11 September incidents. The United States
refused to provide such proof for security reasons. Despite not providing this proof
and despite the fact that the United States government did not recognize the Taliban
government; the United States threatened to use force against Afghanistan as it
viewed the government of Afghanistan as an accomplice to al-Qaida and ultimately
responsible for the attacks because it had been harboring al-Qaida personnel,
including its leader Osama Bin Laden.
Offers by the government of Afghanistan to arrest and try Osama Bin Laden if
provided the proof of his involvement were ignored by the United States. By the
beginning of October, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top decision-making
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body, invoked Article 5 1 thereby obligating Member States to assist the United States,
which was viewed by the Council to be under military attack. NATO Secretary
General Lord Robertson stated:
[T]he attack against the United States on 11 September was directed
from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack
on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North American shall be
considered an attack against them all… [He] reiterate[d] that the
United States of American can rely on the full support of its 18 NATO
Allies in the campaign against terrorism. 2
On 7 October 2001, the United States and its allies began using force against
Afghanistan. 3 The use of force continues until today, although because the
government of Afghanistan has been destroyed by the use of force in November 2001,
it is possible to evaluate the legality of the use of force both under the jus ad bellum
and jus in bello.
The evaluation of the jus ad bellum will consider the legality of the United States’
use of force from the point of view of international law. This will center on the
prohibition of the use of force found in the Charter of the United Nations (UN
Charter), 4 and under customary international law. It will also consider the legal

1

North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement at NATO Headquarters (Oct. 2, 2001), at
http://www.nato.int.
3
The United States policy regarding the Taliban is that there is no distinction between them and
the organizations that they allegedly claim to be terrorist, al-Qaida in this case. President Bush stated
that, “in this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of
innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at
their own peril.” George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training
Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, 37 W EEKLY COMP . PRES. DOC. 1432, 1432
(Oct. 7, 2001). He further stated, “We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be
regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 W EEKLY COMP .
PRES. DOC. 1347, 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001).
4
Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force Oct. 24,
1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter].{ TA \l "Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1153 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter]." \s "U.N. Charter" \c 5 }
2
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justification that may allow a State to use force by exception to the general
prohibition.
The evaluation of the jus in bello will concentrate on the conduct of hostilities
irrespective of whether the use of force was legal in the first place. When a state of
armed conflict exists, the laws of war bind the conflicting parties and place legal
restraints on their conduct. 5 These laws limit both the means that may be used to
engage in a war and require certain precautions to be taken to respect human life.
They also relate to the conduct of hostilities and to the minimum protections that
should be afforded to the individual. This law is found in the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 Additional Protocols, 6 as well as in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 7 and 1907, 8 and under customary international law.
5

See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL ., INTERNATIONAL LAW : CASES AND M ATERIALS 1019, 1025-1026 (3rd
ed. 1993); M ALCOLM N. SHAW , INTERNATIONAL LAW 806 (4th ed. 1997); Christopher Greenwood,
Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN A RMED
CONFLICTS 1-38, 10 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1999). See generally Su Wei, The Application of Rules
Protecting Combatants and Civilians Against the Effects of the Employment of Certain Means and
Methods of Warfare, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 375-393 (Frits
Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989). Jean Pictet states that the International Committee of the Red
Cross adopted the following to be the full definition of international humanitarian law:
By ‘international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts’ the International Committee of
the Red Cross means international rules, established by treaties and custom, which are specifically
intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or non-international
armed conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of parties to a conflict to use
the methods and means of warfare of their choice or protect persons and property that are, or may
be, affect by conflict.
Quoted in Jean Pictet, International Humanitarian Law: Definition, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW xix-xxii, xxi (Henry Dunant Institute ed., 1988).
6
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention
(I)]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter
Geneva Convention (II)]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
7
Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2)
949, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900) [hereinafter Hague Convention (II) of
1899].
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8

Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3)
461, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV) of
1910].

11

QUESTIONS OF LAW

The following are the main questions discussed in this thesis:
1. Was the United States use of force against Afghanistan a violation of
international law?
2. Could the United States use of force be justified as self-defense?
3. Was the government of Afghanistan’s use of force against the United States
and its allies justified as self-defense?
4. Does the illegitimate use of force mitigate State responsibility under
international humanitarian law?
5. What international humanitarian law is applicable to the armed conflict
between Afghanistan and the United States?
6. What international humanitarian laws were violated in the conflict in
Afghanistan?
7. What remedies are available for violations of international law?
8. What remedies might be available in future armed conflicts under the Statute
of the International Criminal Court?
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SOURCES OF LAW
As concerns the application of jus ad bellum, 9 this thesis applies the UN Charter, 10
the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 11 and customary international law
regarding the legality of the use of force. 12
As concerns the application of jus in bello, 13 this thesis considers the Four Geneva
Conventions from 1949 14 and the Hague Convention (IV) concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and its annex from 1907. 15 The latter Convention contains
codifications of customary international humanitarian law. Provisions from it are thus
sometimes used to indicate an expression of customary international law. The United
States has ratified both Conventions while Afghanistan has ratified only the Four
Geneva Conventions. 16 Provisions from other conventions or treaties that reflect
norms of customary international law will also be considered.
Although Afghanistan is not a party to the Hague Convention (IV) 17 (which has a
‘general participation clause’ that attempts to restrict the application of the rules in the
Convention to State parties) 18 it is the contention of this thesis that the rules contained
therein have evolved into customary international law and are thus binding on all
parties to the conflict. In paragraph 35 of the Report of the Secretary General pursuant
9

Law of war that deals with legality of starting a war.
U.N. Charter, supra note 4.
11
Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
12
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 188 (June 27).
13
Relates to actual conduct of hostilities and the minimum protection to be afforded to individuals
also known as the laws of armed conflict or humanitarian law.
14
Geneva Convention (I), (II), (III), (IV), supra note 6.
15
Hague Convention (IV) of 1910, supra note 8.
16
Afghanistan ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on Sept. 26, 1956, and the United States
on Aug. 2, 1955. The United States ratified the Hague Convention (IV) on Nov. 27, 1909.
17
Hague Convention (IV) of 1910, supra note 8.
10
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to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808, 19 it is pointed out that rules of
international humanitarian law, that have become part of customary international law,
beyond doubt, are those rules in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 20 the Hague
Convention (IV), 21 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1948, 22 and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 1945. 23
Frits Kalshoven specifically cites the Hague Conventions and Regulations on Land
Warfare of 1899 24 and 1907, 25 stating that with the outbreak of the World War II,
those Conventions had “been so widely accepted by States that they had become part
of international customary law. After the war, this view was endorsed in so many
words by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its judgment of the
major war criminals of the European theatre.” 26 This indicates the customary status of
the provisions of the respective Hague Conventions.
Customary rules are also essential for the protection of victims’ rights that are not
covered by treaties, for example when a State involved in an armed conflict is not a
party to a particular treaty. 27 Furthermore, in some domestic legal systems only rules
of customary law are directly applicable. 28 However, as Sassoli and Bouvier suggest,
the reliance on custom as a source of international humanitarian law has drawbacks.
The authors point out that:
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See infra note 185, for reference to the clause.
Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
20
Geneva Conventions (I), (II), (III), (IV), supra note 6.
21
Hague Convention (IV) of 1910, supra note 8.
22
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
23
Charter of the International Military Tribunal established by Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal].
24
Hague Convention (II) of 1899, supra note 7.
25
Hague Convention (IV) of 1910, supra note 8.
26
FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE W AGING OF W AR 18 (1987).
27
M ARCO SASSOLI & A NTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN W AR? 109 (1999).
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Id.
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It is very difficult to base uniform application of the law, military
instruction, and the repression of breaches on custom which by
definition is in constant evolution, is difficult to formulate, and is
always subject to controversy. The codification of international
humanitarian law began 150 years ago precisely because the
international community found the actual practice of belligerents
unacceptable, while custom is – despite all modern theories – also
based on the actual practice of belligerents. 29
Additionally, this thesis will attempt to apply provisions of instruments that might
be applied to the actions of the United States’ allies since they have ratified them.
Specifically, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions would be applied to the conduct of
the armed forces whose State is a party to the protocol. For example, Protocol I would
apply to the armed forces of the United Kingdom, Canada and Norway, all of whom
have ratified it, and are serving as United States’ allies in the conflict. It will also be
illustrated that several provisions of Protocol I are considered to be of customary
status.

29

Id.
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LEGAL METHODOLOGY

This thesis applies international humanitarian law to the conflict in Afghanistan.
Having been the initial factor that led to this conflict making the situation applicable
under international humanitarian law, the use of force is covered in the first chapter.
Chapter I will evaluate the use of force with attention both to the general prohibition
and the justification of self-defense. It will be assumed that Osama Bin Laden and alQaida were responsible for the 11 September events as the United States alleged. 30
Chapter II will examine the development of international humanitarian law.
Chapter III will then apply international humanitarian law to the armed conflict in
Afghanistan that begun on 7 October 2001. Among the rules considered are those
relating to indiscriminate attacks, prisoners of war, placing civilians near military
targets, and taking over hospitals for military purposes.
Chapter IV will address the possible remedies to violations of international
humanitarian law in Afghanistan. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles
on State Responsibility31 will be the focus of this assessment concerning the
consequences for violations of international law.

Note on the legal Status of the Taliban government:
Although the status of the Taliban as the de facto government of Afghanistan,
when the use of force upon it took place, is not a matter of relevance to this thesis, it
is the contention of this thesis that the Taliban government was bound by international
30

An in depth study of this case is beyond the scope of this paper.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Int’l L. Comm’n, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001).
31
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legal obligations. The argument is based on the fact that the Taliban government has
acceded to the treaties that the previous government of Afghanistan has ratified,
especially those dealing with human rights and humanitarian affairs. It is also relevant
to note that Professor Ian Brownlie had stated that legally, the distinction between de
jure/de facto recognition and the recognition as the de jure/de facto government does
not matter. 32 He further states that “certainly the legal and political elements of
caution in the epithet de facto in either context are rarely regarded as significant, and
courts both national and international accord the same strength to de facto recognition
as evidence of an effective government as they do to a de jure recognition.” 33 He
maintains that the recognition occurs “exclusively in the political context of
recognition of governments.” 34
Furthermore, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in respect of Treaties, 35 succession “means the replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.” 36 This
Convention governs situations when a nation dissolves, fragments, or goes through a
change where it becomes one or more nations. The term succession though, has to be
evidently made distinguishable from the continuity of identity, “where a state is not
changed as a subject under international law by external or internal events and thus
retains the same identity. If the state indicates that this identity binds it to its
international rights and duties, the problem of state succession does not even arise.” 37
In this case, it is important to note that a change of government does not break the

32

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (5d. 1998).
Id.
34
Id.
35
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 17 I.L.M.
1488 (1978).
36
Id. art. 2(1)(b).
37
Dieter Papenfu, Comment, The Fate of the International Treaties of the GDR Within the
Framework of German Unification, 92 A M. J. INT ’L L. 469 (July 1998).
33
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continuity of a State where a change in regime does not allow for a denunciation of
treaties. Alternatively, there is no sign that Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban
objected to the bound by multilateral treaties to which the predecessor government
were a party.
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CHAPTER I: Use of Force

A. General Overview on the Use of Force and the Development of its Prohibition
There were few restraints on the use of force by States as between 1648, when
nation-states system emerged, until the middle of the 20th century. The resort to war
was seen as a lawful measure to which a State may have recourse on condition that
the war was declared. 38 This state of international affairs was the result of the
“European balance of power system after the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, [where] the
concept of the just war disappeared from international law as such.” 39 States were
regarded as equal and sovereign and consequently, what was important was not
whether or not a war that took place was just, but rather whether a state of war
existed. 40
By the beginning of the 20th century, The Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) 41
prohibited the use of force by States as an instrument of foreign policy. In 1945, with
the creation of the UN, the Charter prohibited the use of force in its Article 2(4). 42
However, Article 51 of the Charter provided for the exceptional use of force,
individual and collective, in self-defense. 43 The right to use force in self-defense as
well as the Security Council using force when necessary was guaranteed, but subject

38

A NTHONY C. A REND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 17
(1993).
39
M ALCOLM N. SHAW , supra note 5, at 779. See e.g., IAN BROWNLIE , INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 14 (1963).
40
IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 48, at 26-28 (1963), cited in M ALCOLM N. SHAW , supra note 5, at
779.
41
Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
42
U.N. Charter, supra note 4. See Appendix A for the full text of this article.
43
Id.
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to the control of the Security Council. Under Chapter VII, the UN Security Council
was authorized to use force when there was threat to peace and security. And in many
cases when States committed acts of aggression “the vast majority of the world’s
nations routinely and automatically condemn it as illegal.” 44 The definition of what
the term aggression encompassed was outlined by General Assembly Resolution 3314
(1974), rendering a more detailed definition of aggression and declaring it to be “the
use of force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations.” 45

1. Customary International Law in Relation to the Use of Force
General Assembly Resolution 2131 issued in 1965, 46

concerning the

Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
their Independence and Sovereignty, stresses that:
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference
or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its
political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned. 47
44

Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43
HARV. INT ’L L.J. 1, 1 (Winter 2002). See, e.g., S.C. Res. 600, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at
19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990) (condemning the ‘Iraqi invasion of Kuwait’); S.C. Res. 678, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990) (which authorized the use of ‘all
necessary means’ to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 479, U.N. SCOR,
35th Sess., 2248th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/479 (1980) (calling upon ‘Iran and Iraq to refrain
immediately from any further use of force.’); S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/1511 (1950) (calling on member states to ‘furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the armed attack.’). Slaughter and White further state that, “most recent
incidents of the use of force begin as a civil conflict only to escalate subsequently into an international
conflict contrary to Article 2(4).” See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at 10,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998) (calling on member states to respect the ‘territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ based on Article 2(4) while working to secure an ‘enhanced status for
Kosovo.’); S.C. Res. 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3066th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/749 (1992)
(deploying a U.N. protective force in Yugoslavia after the escalation of the domestic conflict there).
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G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 142, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
See also G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/36/761 (1981).
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This principle of non-intervention had already been applied in the Corfu Channel 48
case when the International Court of Justice stated that “between independent States,
respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations,” 49 and that States have an obligation to respect each other’s political
integrity under international law. 50 D.J. Harris, an international law scholar, further
notes that, “the existence in the opinio juris of States of the principle of nonintervention is backed by established and substantial practice.” 51 General Assembly
Resolution 2625 dealing with Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in 1970 52 reaffirmed that violations of these
principles were against the norms of international law. 53
The prohibition of the use of force is also established under customary
international law. The existence of a rule as customary international law requires two
primary elements: State practice and opinio juris. 54 In the Military and Paramilitary
Activities case,55 the Court looked at the practice and opinio juris of States and noted
that the 1970 Declaration on Principles in International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States had been adopted by the overwhelming
majority of States and was thus evidence that the prohibition of the use of force was
customary international law. 56 The consent was seen by the Court not merely as a
“reiteration or elucidation” of States’ commitments to the provisions of the UN
Charter, but as acceptance of the validity of the rules declared in the resolution as
48

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
Id. at 35.
50
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customary international law. 57 The Court confirmed the statement made by the
International Law Commission that the prohibition of the use of force codified in the
UN Charter has the character of jus cogens. 58

2. Treaty Law in Relation to the Use of Force
The UN Charter in Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force where it states that, “all
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 59 This provision binds
member States of the United Nations. 60 However, there are exceptions to the rules laid
down in Article 2(4) where Article 51 acknowledges the inherent right of all States,
whether collectively or individually, to use force in self-defense. 61 The Security
Council under Chapter VII is also given the power to authorize the use force. 62
Chapter VII gives the Security Council the legal authority to determine whether a
threat or breach to peace, or an act of aggression exists or not, and to further decide
upon the action to be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. 63
While Article 41 relates to measures not involving the use of force, 64 Article 42
authorizes the Security Council to resort to measures involving the use of force, if the
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measures described in Article 41 have been deemed or proved to be inadequate. 65 The
measures relating to the use of force in Article 42 include “such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”66 Article 43 further
requires member states to make available its armed forces for assistance, 67 while
Article 49 requires member states to assist in the carrying out of measures that the
Security Council decides upon. 68
Collective security may be said to be the goal of the system of international
security created by the Charter of the United Nations whereby an attack on one State
is considered an attack on all. This system operates by not allowing a government to
“conquer another or otherwise disturb the peace for fear of retribution from all other
governments.” 69 It must be stressed, therefore, that while Article 2(4) prohibits all
forms of force, Article 51 grants the right to use force only in relation to self-defense
and expands it to include collective self-defense. The right to collective self-defense
enumerated in Article 51 is regarded as customary international law. 70 In the Military
and Paramilitary Activities case the Court recognized this norm and further
concluded, “that the requirement of a request by the State which is the victim of the
alleged attack is additional to the requirement that such a State should have declared
itself to have been attacked.” 71 Thus, the exercise of collective self-defense requires
that a victim State request assistance. 72
65
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B. Jus ad bellum
The term jus ad bellum refers to the legality of starting a war. 73 It rests upon the
determination of whether a war is justified where “[t]his school of thought determines
‘just wars’ from ‘unjust wars’ and was pervasive in the early development of law. In
particular it allowed Christian thinkers the moral standing to support war. When
fighting a “just war” it was permissible to violate any and all current rules of armed
conflict.” 74 As will be further elaborated in Chapter II, this view has changed where
whether or not the initial use of force was legal, parties in the conflict are obliged to
respect the rules of armed conflict.
Consequently, it is imperative to understand the context of the rules of law that
regulate the conduct of States when resorting to non-peaceful means of resolving their
conflicts. Pointed out earlier, the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact)75 prohibited the
use of force by States as an instrument of foreign policy, where “[t]oday there is a reemergence of the “just war” concept and the idea of the ‘modern’ Jus ad bellum is
based upon several articles from the Charter of the United Nations. They are Article
2(4), Article 51, and the heart of Chapter VII (Articles 43-48).” 76 Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter prohibits the use of force, while Article 51 of the same Charter
acknowledges the right of self-defense as an inherent right of all States, individual or
collective. Understanding the scope and meaning of those articles is crucial to issues
relating to the use of force in international law.
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Article 2(4) goes beyond prohibiting war, as it does not distinguish between wars
and using force that falls short of war, such as reprisals. 77 Therefore, this Article
points to all threats of, and acts of, the use of force without distinction. As an
exception to Article 2(4), Article 51 permits the use of force as means of self-defense
against an armed attack. It is important to note that Article 51 confines itself to
measures of self-defense those where the purpose is defensive and not to wage war.
Furthermore, there is the condition that an armed attack has to have taken place,
which seems to extinguish any right to anticipatory self-defense.

C. Legality of the Use of Force on Afghanistan
There are different types of legal designations that may have been used to legally
classify the United States’ use of force against Afghanistan. The first is the use of
force as aggression. This type of force is prohibited as discussed earlier. The second
most obvious description that may also be a legal justification for the use of force is
self-defense. Where a claim to self-defense is not justified by the facts, however then
this description may also dissolve into unjustified and illegal aggression. The third is
the use of force as a reprisal. Reprisals are justified uses of force that may be
considered aggression, when the narrow requirements of a legitimate reprisal are not
met. A major difference between self-defense and reprisals is that while the former is
for defensive purposes, the latter is a retaliatory act. Finally, the use of force is
permissible if authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII. Full
implementation of this Charter-based system of collective self-defense requires that
States and the Security Council attempt to resolve the dispute peacefully. When the

77
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Security Council determines that this has failed, then according to Articles 42 it may
authorize the use of military force. Such force should be under the authority and the
control of the UN,78 or a regional body authorized to undertake force by the UN. 79
The first scenario involving a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that
prohibits the use of force by a State against other States has already been discussed
earlier. 80 The second scenario concerning self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter that gives States the ‘inherent right’ to respond in self-defense, individually or
collectively, if faced with an armed attack occurring on a Member State of the UN.
Self-defense provided for in Article 51 is thus an exception when a State can legally
use force, which in itself does not violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 81 However,
if no justification is applicable then the use of force in this case must be considered as
aggression. The third scenario is that of a reprisal, which is an action that is prima
facia illegal, but under certain circumstances becomes justified. The International
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project82 accepted
that the resort to reprisals or countermeasures could justify an otherwise illegal act.
However, it would have to be done in response to an international wrongful act of a
State and be ‘directed against that State’ with the stipulation that certain conditions
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are met. 83 Arbitration tribunals have held the same opinion. 84 In the decision of the
Naulilaa case, 85 which is regarded as the classic example that enumerates criteria for a
reprisal that would be permissible, the tribunal laid down three conditions that have to
be met. Those included: “first, there had to be a ‘a previous violation of international
law.’ 86 … Second, the reprisal had to be ‘preceded by an unsuccessful demand for
redress.’87 ... Third, the reprisals ‘must be proportionate to the injury suffered’.” 88 The
German reprisal in this case that included a “military raid on the colony of Angola,
which destroyed property, in retaliation for the mistaken killing of three Germans
lawfully in the Portuguese territory,” 89 was regarded not to be a justified reprisal by
the rejection of the German claim on the three grounds discussed above. 90 The
Naulilaa case thus sets a precedent for not allowing reprisals that do not meet the
stated requirements. In this case, reprisals using force was not ruled out but the
tribunal set the conditions outlined above for a reprisal to be justified. 91

1. The United States Attack on Afghanistan:
With the support of Pakistan, which provided access to its airspace, the United
States launched an attack on Afghanistan claiming to be acting in self-defense. 92 The
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United States regarded the attack on 11 September, as an act of war against it. 93 The
attack on Afghanistan that was initiated on 7 October 2001 was considered justified
under international law as self-defense, according to the government of the United
States.
As of 7 October 2001, there was a state of armed conflict in Afghanistan, and
therefore, the laws of war or international humanitarian law bound all parties to that
conflict. The armed conflict existed because one country, the United States, had used
extensive armed force against another country, Afghanistan. This use of force was
also explicitly stated to be against the territorial integrity and political independence
of Afghanistan. The laws obliging States to respect human rights and limiting the
means and methods of conducting a war will be discussed in Chapter II of this thesis.
Clear evidence that the United States was claiming to be acting in self-defense can
be found in the letter sent by the permanent Representative of the United States to the
UN on 7 October 2001 on the day the use of force was initiated against Afghanistan,
explaining why the United States together with other States, resorted to force. It states
the following:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I
wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of
America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the
exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence
following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United
States on 11 September 2001.
On 11 September 2001, the United States was the victim of massive
and brutal attacks in the states of New York, Pennsylvania and
Virginia. These attacks were specifically designed to maximize the
loss of life; they resulted in the death of more than 5,000 persons,
including nationals of 81 countries, as well as the destruction of four
civilian aircraft, the World Trade Center towers and a section of the
Pentagon. Since 11 September, my Government has obtained clear and
compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is
Global Coalition against Terrorism: September-November 2001 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/index.cfm?docid=5889.
93
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supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in
the attacks. There is still much we do not know. Our inquiry is in its
early stages. We may find that our self-defence requires further actions
with respect to other organizations and other States.
The attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ongoing threat to the
United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization
have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this
organization as a base of operation. Despite every effort by the United
States and the international community, the Taliban regime has refused
to change its policy. From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda
organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack
innocent people throughout the world and target United States
nationals and interests in the United States and abroad.
In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defence, United States armed forces
have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on
the United States. These actions include measures against Al-Qaeda
terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan. In carrying out these actions, the United States is
committed to minimizing civilian casualties and damage to civilian
property. In addition, the United States will continue its humanitarian
efforts to alleviate the suffering of the people of Afghanistan. We are
providing them with food, medicine and supplies. 94
The United States also claimed that it is exercising its right under international
law to use force in self-defense in retaliation to the attacks on its territory on 11
September 2001, in statements by United States President George W. Bush who
referred to the 11 September events as “acts of war’”. 95 In addition, the United States
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield stated, “this is not something that begins with
a significant event and ends with a significant event…. The truth is, this is not about
revenge. It’s not about retaliation. This is about self-defense. The only way we can
defend against terrorism is by taking the fight to the terrorists.” 96 The official policy
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of the United States is that it is acting in self-defense. This is illustrated by its public
announcement on the day of the use of force on Afghanistan stating that, “the U.S.
Government initiated military action today pursuant to its inherent right of selfdefense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, after the events of 11 September
in the United States.” 97 Furthermore, the letter presented by Ambassador Negroponte
to the Security Council stated that the attacks taking place in Afghanistan were
United States’ acts of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 98 Finally,
Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, had stated that the action of the United
States was justified as self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and therefore
needs no UN authorization to carry it out. These statements can be considered to
reflect the official policy of the United States.
The statements made by United States officials that it is acting within the right
given to it under Article 51 of the UN Charter, indicates that the claim is that of a
self-defense in relation to an existing armed attack that occurred. While Article 51
sets the guidelines for the inherent right to self-defense, the Caroline99 example may
further be used to elaborate on certain conditions that need to be met. The incident of
the Caroline involved a set of correspondences between the United States and United
Kingdom foreign ministers. Although dealing with anticipatory attacks upon a State,
the relevant issues that were outlined in the exchange of correspondences were that of
necessity and proportionality, in which the use of force is only permitted when there
is a “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
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of moment for deliberation.” 100 Proportionality means that the use of force must not
be ‘unreasonable’ or ‘excessive’. However, the Caroline doctrine of allowing
anticipatory self-defense under those conditions is still not legitimate as Article 51
specifically states that self-defense is justified ‘if an armed attack occurs against a
member State’. 101
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, 102 looking at the issue of the use
of force as a resort to self-defense or a collective one and its status in customary
international law, the Court remained subjected to the Caroline requirements of
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’, in which it stated that Article 51 of the UN
Charter 103 did not change this. 104 Article 51 gives the right of individual or collective
self-defense if attacks occur on any member of the UN. The Court recognized that
this article in itself refers to pre-existing customary law when it stated the following
in paragraph 176:
100
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As regards the suggestion that the areas covered by the two sources of
law are identical, the Court observes that the United Nations Charter
… by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of
force in international relations. On one essential point, this treaty itself
refers to pre-existing customary international law; this reference to
customary law is contained in the actual text of Article 51, which
mentions the “inherent right”…of individual or collective selfdefense, which “nothing in the present Charter shall impair” and
which applied in the event of an armed attack. The Court therefore
finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that
there is a “natural” or “inherent” right of self-defense, and it is hard to
see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its
present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. 105
This doctrine could be applied to the use of force against Afghanistan to determine if
the United States’ use of force is justified. To be justified, the self-defense would
have to have adhered to the principles of necessity and the use of force must be
proportional to the original attack against the United States. Similarly, Peter H.F.
Bekker (PhD International law), former staff attorney of the International Court of
Justice explains that in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 106
the International Court of Justice held that “Charter provisions apply to any use of
force, regardless of the type of weapon employed, and that the dual customary
condition of necessity and proportionality applies whatever the force used in selfdefense.” 107 Consequently, this reinforces that the condition of necessity and
proportionality must be met by the United States. Thus, for the United States’ use of
force to be lawful it must be proportionate to the danger faced. 108 In a comment by
John Cerone, Executive Director of the War Crimes Research Office at the American
University’s Washington College of Law, in the American Society of International
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Law Insights, he notes that for a State to resort to self-defense it has to first establish
that the State against which it is using force “has committed an internationally
wrongful act.” 109
It is therefore necessary to determine if Afghanistan was responsible for an
international wrongful act that allowed the United States to legitimately use force in
self-defense. Perhaps the first point of importance is that the United States itself did
not direct its accusations at the Taliban government of Afghanistan, but at al-Qaida
that is headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was allegedly hosted by the government of
Afghanistan. 110 The question of attributability arises, where if the acts of al-Qaida are
found to be attributable to the Taliban or Afghanistan, then the United States is
justified in its use of force. However, the United States did not direct such accusations
to the government of Afghanistan, but rather considered them enemies for their
unwillingness to hand members of al-Qaida, including Osama Bin Laden, over to the
United States. 111
Regarding the issue of necessity discussed previously, to determine whether the
United States’ act was necessary an important question that should be addressed is —
109
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was another reasonable avenue open to the United States that it could have taken
instead of using force against Afghanistan? This is especially important because it
was not Afghanistan, or the government, that initially was responsible for the acts
committed on 11 September 2001, even by the United States government’s own
admission. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter requires member States of the UN to “settle
their international disputes by peaceful means.” 112
Measures that could have been taken include what the United States first resorted
to, which was requesting that the Afghanistan government hand over Osama Bin
Laden. Afghanistan refused to hand him over to the United States claiming that it
needed to see evidence that demonstrated his responsibility for the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 113 Applying proportionality, discussed earlier,
to the case at hand, would entail that if the United States holds that the international
wrongful act that Afghanistan has committed is Afghanistan’s failure to prosecute or
extradite the perpetrators of the attacks on the United States, it then cannot take
measures of use of force because of Afghanistan’s failure to try or extradite, a breach
of its international obligation. 114 The necessity and proportionality elements appear to
be missing from the actions of the United States. Furthermore, proportionality could
also be assessed in the military operation carried out by the United States in
Afghanistan, in comparison to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Furthermore, by establishing that the wrongful act committed by Afghanistan is
the refusal to hand over the man responsible for the attacks on the United States, the
use of force on Afghanistan by the United States as a claim of self-defense, not
authorized by the UN, is unjustified because the element of necessity was not
satisfied because there were other reasonable options open to the United States. The
element of proportionality was absent too since the use of force is evidently not
proportional to a failure, by Afghanistan, to try or extradite Osama Bin Laden.
On the other hand, the argument that the acts committed on 11 September are
attributed to the government of Afghanistan could be made. The Trial Smelter 115 and
Corfu Channel116 cases demonstrate that States could be held responsible for
knowingly allowing their territory to be used to injure other States. In the Trial
Smelter case, the tribunal held that States are not allowed to use or permit the use of
their territory to injure another State’s territory “when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” 117
An important question arises and that is the nature of the relationship between
officials from the Taliban and members of al-Qaida. 118 If they are distinguishable,
then the traditional test of effective control could be applied, 119 where “it would still
be possible to hold the government responsible for the terrorist acts, but the counter
measures allowed could fall short of the use of force.” 120 Professor of Law, Gregory
Travalio argues that,
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A state that is so weak that it literally cannot control terrorist activity
emanating from within its borders can be hardly said to have acted at
all. Although this may not necessarily preclude the use of military
force in response to a terrorist attack emanating from such a state, the
impotence of a state to control international terrorist organizations
would not be an armed attack against another state, and therefore the
use of force in response is not expressly sanctioned by Article 51. 121
Consequently, the important issue here is the definition of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51
of the UN Charter, where “the mere inability of a state to control terrorist activity
within its borders does not constitute an armed attack by that state.” 122 In Military and
Paramilitary Activities case 123 , the International Court of Justice addressed the issue
of control when it looked at,
[W]hether the activities of the Nicaraguan ‘contras’ could be attributed
to the United States government because of strong evidence that the
contras were largely trained, equipped, and armed by the United
States. The Court decided that only if it could be proved that the
United States exercised effective control over the contras ‘in all fields’
could the contras be considered as acting on behalf of the United
States government. 124
This further reinstates the view that a State that tolerates or encourages terrorist acts
“is an insufficient state connection to constitute an armed attack under Article 51 of
the UN Charter.” 125 In addition, a state is only responsible for culpable acts or
omissions that emanate from its borders. 126 Thus, if Afghanistan’s actions or
omissions were culpable in this case, the United States being the harmed state would
still not necessarily be entitled to respond by using force in self-defense within the
scope of Article 51. 127
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However, if activities of the Taliban and al-Qaida are inseparable, such test would
be deemed useless, where “attacks on the state apparatus could be legitimized either
as a direct attack on the terrorists or as a direct response to a state act. Relevant
evidence in such inquires could come from many sources, including the post hoc
ratification of terrorist acts.” 128 The International Court of Justice in the U.S.
Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran case 129 discussed post hoc ratification of acts.
The Court opinioned that “the approval given [to the actions of students holding
American hostages] … by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian
State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the
Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State.” 130 Consequently, the
Court found that the ‘approval’ or ‘endorsement’ of activities by non-state actors
could “transform the legal nature of the situation … into acts of state, ”131 holding the
State responsible as though it had perpetuated the initial actions. 132 Consequently, the
question remains as to whether the Taliban was distinguishable from al-Qaida. It still
stands that if the United States was justified to use force it would still be subject to the
necessity and proportionality requirement.
Finally, in relation to the use of force as self-defense and the question of
international humanitarian law, Theodor Meron makes reference, in his article titled
The Humanization of Humanitarian law, to the opinion of the International Court of
Justice in 1996 concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 133
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stating that this opinion showed the “distinctions between proportionality in jus in
bello and in jus ad bellum.” 134 He points out to the following from the opinion:
As the Court stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua…: “there is a specific rule
whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule
well established in customary international law.” This dual condition
applied equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of
force employed.
The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear
weapons in self-defense in all circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that
is proportionate under the law of self-defense, must, in order to be lawful, also meet
the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict that comprise in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law. 135

D. Legality of the Use of Force by the Taliban Government of Afghanistan
To establish whether or not the Taliban, the existing government of Afghanistan at
the time, violated the customary rule of the prohibition of the use of force, the same
standard that was applied above to the United States’ use of force against Afghanistan
should be applied. The rule of importance is Article 51 of the UN Charter that gives
States the right to resort to self-defense, whether individually or collectively, if an
armed attack occurs on that State. 136
After the United States started its military campaign early October 2001, 137 the
reaction that came from Afghanistan was that of Taliban forces, defending their
territorial sovereignty and therefore acting on behalf of the State. Now acting as State
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forces, the Taliban, allied by al-Qaida, engaged in an armed conflict with the United
States and its allies. Consequently, since the Taliban reacted in self-defense to the
attacks by the United States and its allies, their use of force falls within the scope of
Article 51. The key issue is that an armed attack against it took place, and thus, it had
a right to act under Article 51.
However, it was established above that there are generally accepted conditions for
the resort to self-defense under customary international law. Where the issue of
importance was regarding the necessity and proportionality of the use of force in selfdefense. Self-defense is permitted given the necessity of responding to the acts and
furthermore it has to be proportional to the initial acts against the State, where it
should be reasonable and not excessive. 138 The resort to self-defense is seen as the use
of force, which falls short of war. The purpose of resorting to self-defense is then not
to launch a campaign of war, but may well include defending against it. 139
Furthermore, the adherences to international humanitarian norms is incumbent upon
parties to the conflict, including the government of Afghanistan, whether or not the
initial armed attack by the United States was legal or not.

138
139

D. J. HARRIS, supra note 50, at 895.
A NTHONY C. A REND & ROBERT J. BECK, supra note 38, at 18.

39

CHAPTER II: Historical Overview of International Humanitarian Law and its
Application
“I establish these laws to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak.” 140
Hammurabi, King of Babylon.
A. History and Evolution of International Humanitarian Law

1. Cultural Context of International Humanitarian Law
Humanitarian principles are based in diverse civilizations and cultures. 141 For
purposes of this thesis it is relevant to note that these principles were apparent in
times of war in relation to the conduct of hostilities. They could also be “traced back
to ancient times. The Summerians, Hammurabi

King of Babylon, Cyrus I

King

of the Persians, and the Hittites all formulated rules or codes that were designed to
regulate and provide structure to armed conflict.” 142 As will be illustrated in this
Chapter, today we have treaties and conventions that regulate the conduct of war and
obligate State parties; which have ratified the instruments, and non-State parties when
a norm has evolved into customary law, and thus extend the legal obligation
encompassed in these treaties to all States.
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Following is a brief account of several principles regulating the methods of
warfare in the Islamic context, which concisely illustrates that international
humanitarian norms have taken into consideration different traditional approaches to
conducting wars. In addition, it further demonstrates that international humanitarian
law is derived from different cultural backgrounds and civilizations. International law
has been generally viewed as a Western approach that does not always coincide with
Islamic principles or norms. 143 The discussion below on Islamic principles illustrates
that this contention cannot be made with regards to humanitarian law, as it is derived
from those very principles found in ancient diverse cultures and civilizations, one of
which is the Islamic culture and way of life. One of the parties to the conflict is an
Islamic State and thus, it is crucial to show how relevant principles of international
humanitarian law are to Islamic laws and customs.
The relevance of Islam to the rule of law in this field can be in the concept of
international humanitarian law in societies espousing Islamic legal systems. 144 The
existences of some rules of international humanitarian law during the time of the
Prophet Mohammed are evident in the historical contexts and accounts of the wars
fought at that time. The concept of humanity is also seen by the orders given by
Caliph Abu Bakr in 632 to his troops “never to destroy palm trees, burn dwellings or
cornfields, cut down fruit trees, kill livestock unless constrained by hunger and never
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to lay hands on monasteries.” 145 Concerning that protection to be afforded to victims
of an armed conflict, Professor Mahmoud (Public and International Law, Al-Azhar
University) explains that Islam guaranteed those victims, including the wounded, sick
and shipwrecked, special protection. He substantiates his argument by making
reference to the order that the Prophet gave his companions in the Battle of Badr
stating that they are obliged to be generous to their prisoners of war. 146 For example,
they were to provide prisoners of war food before they themselves ate. 147
Consequently, we see the Koranic verses that were revealed to the Prophet referring to
this kind of treatment by the soldiers in the Battle of Badr, “And (they) feed the needy
for the love of Him [Allah], and the orphans and the captives. We feed you for the
sake of God, desiring neither recompense nor thanks. We fear the dismal day
calamitous from our Lord.” 148 Thus prisoners of war were protected as a plea for
God’s mercy and fear of His punishment. 149
Many other concepts that were to become established principles of modern
international humanitarian law can be traced back to the Koran and the practices of
the Prophet. For example, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants is
demanded by the Koranic verse that states: “Fight those in the way of God who fight
you…” 150 There are also rules concerning the protection of civilian populations and
objects that come from the Prophet’s reported statement to his officers who were sent
out to lead an army to fight a war: “Fight in the name of God, fight those who deny
God; kill not children and do not betray, mutilate or commit perfidy.” 151 Finally, the
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humanitarian dictate in distinguishing between military and non-military targets can
be seen in the words of Caliph Omar, the second caliph, when he instructed his
officers who were going to battle to “[o]ppress nobody, for God loves not oppressors.
Be not cowardly in combat, cruel in strength nor abusive in victory. Kill not the aged,
women or children and be mindful not to kill them during skirmishes or cavalry
incursions.” 152 From this brief review, it can be seen that diverse civilizations and
cultural antecedents played a meaningful role in the development of principles and
foundations of international humanitarian law and that this law did not come into
being all of a sudden.

2. Development of International Humanitarian Law
Centuries later, the notion that wars should be regulated was progressing where it
was “espoused by the likes of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius,
and Jean Jacques Rousseau.” 153 The first international war crimes trial for the
violation of the rules of war was that of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. 154 After the
Duke of Burgundy made him the governor of Breisach “he subsequently proceeded to
rape, murder, confiscate private property, and illegally tax (to name a few) its’
citizens.” 155
Hugo Grotius, father of modern international law, wrote his The Law of War and
Peace in 1625. 156 This publication was inspired by the two wars during the Holy
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Roman Empire, the 100-years and the 30-years wars. He conceptualized a societygoverning people in this area, to which later, the notion of nation-states evolved.
During that time, the use of force was legal. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 put an
end to the 30-years war and solidified the concept of nation-states. It was evident
though, that it was based on the principles that were outlined in the works of Hugo
Grotius. 157 In addition, Grotius had “insisted that war should be governed by a strict
set of laws.”158 This was a reaction to how combatants in the wars behaved, where he
wrote:
Fully convinced, by the considerations which I have advanced, that
there is a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and
in war, I have had many and weighty reasons for undertaking to write
upon this subject. Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of
restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be
ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no
cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no
longer any respect for the law, divine or human; it is as if, in
accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for
the committing of all crimes. 159
During the eighteenth century, the age of the Enlightenment produced noted
philosophers; of particular relevance was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 160 In his Social
Contract published in 1762, Rousseau noted,
War, then, is not a relation between man and man, but a relation
between State and State, in which individuals are enemies only by
accident, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as
members of the fatherland, but as its defenders. … The aim of war
being the destruction of the hostile State, we have a right to slay its
defenders so long as they have arms in their hands; but as soon as they
lay them down and surrender, ceasing to be enemies or instruments of
the enemy, they become again simply men, and non has any further
right over their lives. Sometimes it is possible to destroy the State
157
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without killing a single one of its members; but war confers no right
except what is necessary to its end. These are not the principles of
Grotius; they are not based on the authority of poets, but are derived
from the nature of things, and are founded on reason. 161
This doctrine elucidates that the conduct of wars should be limited to attacks against
military objectives, leaving aside the civilian population. 162 He further points out that
combatants who have laid down their arms should not be viewed as ‘instruments of
the enemy’, thereby recognizing rights of prisoners of war.
In the early nineteenth century, Napolean’s foreign minister Prince de Talleyrand
sent him a letter dated 20 November 1806 stating,
Three centuries of civilization have given Europe a law of nations, for
which … human nature cannot be sufficiently grateful.
According to the maxim that war is not a relation between one man
and another, but between state and state, in which private persons are
only accidental enemies, not as men, nor even as members or subjects
of the state, but simply as its defenders, the law of nations does not
permit that the rights of war, an of conquest thence derived, should be
applied to peaceable, unarmed citizens, to private properties and
dwellings, to the merchandise of commerce, to the magazines which
contain it, to the vehicles which transport it, to unarmed ships which
carry it on streams and seas, in one word, to the person and the goods
of private individuals.
The law of war, born of civilization, has favored its progress. It is to
this that Europe must ascribe the maintenance and increase of her
prosperity, in the midst of the frequent wars that have divided her. 163
This further illustrates the surrounding atmosphere in Europe during the early 1800s,
where there existed the belief that unarmed civilians and objects of non-military
nature were to be spared. The humanitarian climate was therefore gradually building
up.
During the same time period “custom and rules for the taking and protection of
prisoners of war were also developing.” 164 For example, “the treaty of friendship and
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commerce between Prussia and the United States in 1785 … contained some
exemplary and pioneering provisions for the treatment of prisoners of war. It was also
one of the first attempts to record new principle of humanitarian law in written
form…” 165
By the mid-nineteenth century, those ideas became significant “in military law
though theologians and moralists had often made the point before

that certain

practices should be forbidden, regardless of their military utility, because they were
inhumane.”

166

One of the first attempts of codifying the existing laws of war was in a

manual, the Lieber Code. 167 This code was solely intended for the Union soldiers who
were fighting in the American Civil War and thus did not have the status of a
treaty. 168 It is considered to be the origin of what today we know as the ‘Hague Law’,
written from the perspective of combatants, focusing on the rights and duties of armed
forces in a conflict. 169
In 1863, a Swiss businessman named Henry Dunant published A Memory of
Solferino. 170 The publication was a reaction to his experience witnessing the Battle of
Solferino in 1859, which took place during the Italian War of Unification. 171 As a
civilian present and witnessing, “the plight of 40,000 Austrian, French, and Italian
soldiers wounded”172 in this war between Austria and France, he managed to
organize, at his own expense, relief assistance that provided medical care for the
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wounded. 173 This experience led him to write his book that contributed to the
development of a humanitarian climate, which grew during this period. 174 His main
proposal was to establish an “international Convention acknowledging the status and
function of such relief societies.” 175 It was then that the International Committee of
the Red Cross was formed in 1863 that originated by Henry Dunant’s movement and
was the catalyst for the development of the substance of humanitarian law. 176
By 1864, the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field 177 was adopted wherein, for the first time States
agreed to put a limit “in an international treaty open to universal ratification

their

own power in favour of the individual and, for the first time, war gave way to written,
general law.” 178 By 1899 and 1907 The Hague Conventions were adopted. 179 In 1949
the four Geneva Conventions were adopted, 180 and in 1954 a Geneva Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was further
adopted. 181 The additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were adopted in
1977, one applicable to international armed conflicts and the other to noninternational armed conflicts. 182 Those two instruments “represent the most up-to-date
achievement of the forward movement of humanitarian law, and must be read with,
and as part of, the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”183 During the 1980s and 1990s
Conventions relating to the prohibition of the use of certain types of weapons were
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adopted ending with the 1997 Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Land
Mines. The diagram annexed to the work at Appendix B184 of this thesis, is useful to
show the development of international humanitarian law since the 1864 first Geneva
Convention was adopted.
For comparative purposes, it is worth noting that Article 2 of the Hague
Convention IV of 1910, respecting the laws and customs of war, included the
following: “[t]he provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as
well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers,
and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.” 185 Known as the
‘general participation clause’, this provision attempts to restrict the application of the
rules codified in the Hague regulations. When the drafters of the Geneva Conventions
came together, this clause was excluded. For example Article 2 of the Geneva
Convention (I) of 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field states that “[a]lthough one of the Powers in conflict
may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations.” 186 This is repeated in the Geneva
Conventions (II), 187 (III) 188 and (IV). 189 It was therefore that “the paralyzing effects of
the general participation clause were annulled in the humanitarian instruments of
1929 designed for the better and more humane protection of the sick and wounded
and of POW war victims, the primary concern of the humanitarian law of war.” 190

184

See Appendix B.
Hague Convention (IV) of 1910, supra note 8, art.2.
186
Geneva Convention (I), supra note 6.
187
Geneva Convention (II), supra note 6, art. 2.
188
Geneva Convention (III), supra note 6, art. 2.
189
Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 6, art. 2.
190
G.I.A.D DRAPER, supra note 157, at 77. The author’s reference to the 1929 instruments
includes the following conventions: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions
of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847. Because of
the problems that states encountered during World War I those Conventions were adopted. However,
185

48

International humanitarian law further progressed by protecting combatants while
initially designed to protect noncombatants or those who fall hors de combats.191
Similarly, Theodor Meron argues that the human rights movement has changed the
parameters of humanitarian law by stimulating the “reinterpretation of the Geneva
Conventions as regards the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs) and the definition
of ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Convention.” 192 Therefore, there is a need to
understand the progressive development of international humanitarian law and its
applicability to the conduct of wars. Theodor Meron traces this progressive trend by
stating that:
Human rights law has greatly influenced the formation of customary
rules of humanitarian law, which is discernible in the jurisprudence of
courts and tribunals and the work of international organizations. This
trend began in Nuremberg and has continued through such cases
before the International Court of Justice as Nicaragua v. United States
and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the decisions of the ad
hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the
as-yet-unpublished ICRC study on customary rules of international
humanitarian law. Opinio juris has proven influential in the form of
verbal statements by governmental representatives to international
organizations; the content of resolutions, declarations, and other
normative instruments adopted by such organizations; and the consent
of states to those instruments. 193
The writings of Meron illustrate how the human rights movement has continually
influenced the development of the rule of law in this area and its evolution into
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customary norms. Customary law and its relevance in international humanitarian law
will now be considered.

B. Customary International Humanitarian Law
International custom is referred to in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 194 A
norm or a rule evolves into customary law when two components are satisfied. The
first is the existence of widespread state practice consistent with the norm or rule, and
the second is the presence of opinio juris or acceptance of a legal obligation by
States. 195 Therefore, not only should there be a rule that States’ practice is widespread,
but a belief that the States’ activity is a legal obligation, is necessary. 196 Once those
components are fulfilled, the norm or rule in question is therefore seen as a customary
rule of international law.
The Permanent Court of International Justice has dealt with opinio juris in the S.S.
Lotus case.197 The Court opinioned that although there was practice by States
maintaining that the flag flown on the ship of the accused has jurisdiction over it
rather than the flag of the victim State, an evident legal obligation by States that such
a rule is binding on them, does not exist. 198 Therefore, the norm was not seen as
customary but merely as practice.
The International Court of Justice provided a conclusive judgment regarding the
formation of new customary rules in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case. 199
It stated in its reasoning that “for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must
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the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by
the opinio juris sive necessitates.”200 The Court in this case, further cited to the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases201 when it stated that:
[e]ither the States taking such action or other States in a position to
react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris
sive necessitates’. 202
These authoritative statements indicate that the existence of both practice and opinio
juris

or legal obligation expressed by States

are necessary to render a norm

customary. Thus to summarize, in international humanitarian law the rules that have
evolved into custom are required to have the two components discussed above
being practiced and viewed as legally binding by States.
Furthermore, once a rule of law becomes part of customary international law, the
Court has stated in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case,203 that other
multilateral treaty obligations or reservations do not prevent the application of the
customary principles of law that might be identical to those found in multilateral
treaties, 204 even the UN Charter. The Court was speaking specifically of Article 2(4)
regarding the use of force. 205 It held that the use of force was prohibited by customary
international law as well as by a treaty which the United States was a party, but which
could not be applied because of reservations that had been entered.

200

Id. ¶ 207.
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 20).
202
Id. at 44, ¶ 77, in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 207
(June 27).
203
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
204
Id. ¶ 172-182.
205
Id. ¶ 188.
201

51

In the same case, the International Court of Justice laid down the customary rules of
international humanitarian law specifically referring to common Article 3206 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 207 The Court stated that common Article 3 reflects
customary international law and thus is binding on all parties to the conflict.
Furthermore, although Article 3 is stated to apply to armed conflicts “not of an
international character,” the Court held that “these rules also constitute a minimum
yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to
international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court’s opinion, reflect what
the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary considerations of humanity’.” 208 Additionally, in
the Secretary General’s report on the Statute of the ICTY209 he stated that:
In this context [of crimes against humanity], it is to be noted that the
International Court of Justice has recognized that the prohibitions
contained in common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are
based on ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ and cannot be
breached in an armed conflict, regardless of whether it is international
or internal in character. 210
Professor Theodor Meron notes that in Pictet’s Commentary on the Geneva
Convention (I), 211 it is recognized that when a State refuses to apply one of the
Geneva Conventions, it is still be bound to apply those principles that are considered
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to be expressions of customary norms. 212 Where the reliance is that Article 43 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that when a treaty is denunciated
by a State it “shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfill any obligation
embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law
independently of the treaty,” 213 the principles that a State has the obligation to
observe would be those expressing customary norms.

C. Martens Clause
The Martens Clause in the Preamble of the Hague Conventions states:
The High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen
cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the
arbitrary judgment of military commanders. Until a more complete
code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience… 214
This was later reinstated to give the same meaning in the Geneva Conventions of
1949.215 This clause deals with States’ recognition of the fact that nothing in the
present agreed upon convention shall prevent them from being bound by general
principles of law and thus, customary law continues to have effect.
The Russian delegate and jurist F. F. de Martens proposed this clause in the Hague
Peace Conference. The clause was “articulated in strong language, both rhetorically
and ethically, which goes a long way toward explaining its resonance and influence
212
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on the formation and interpretation of the law of war and international humanitarian
law. These features have compensated for the somewhat vague and indeterminate
legal content of the clause.” 216
Theodor Meron further explains that the “clause was originally designed to
provide residual humanitarian rules for the protection of the population of occupied
territories, especially armed resisters in those territories.” 217 Nowadays, this clause “is
applicable to the whole of humanitarian law and it appears, in one form or another, in
most of the modern treaties on humanitarian law.” 218 As seen from the first sentence
of the Martens Clause quoted above, in its original context, the clause had the
objective of addressing cases that the Convention does not deal with, and should not
“be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.” 219 Consequently, Meron
argues that the Martens Clause has served an additional important goal, which is that
“since all codifications omit some matters, especially those that prove to be contested,
the Martens clause … avoids undermining the customary law status of matters that
were not included.” 220
Greenwood’s analysis of the Martens Clause is similar to that of Meron. Most
importantly, he illustrates that the fact that a treaty is silent on a matter “does not
mean that international law should necessarily be regarded as silent on that
subject,” 221 and that norms of customary international law that were not included in a
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treaty or convention, continue to apply. For example, when assessing a certain matter
where the conventions that bind the parties did not directly have provisions related to
this matter, then there is a reinstatement that “the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of the public conscience,” 222 would still continue to apply. Therefore, the assessment
of the matter would be along those lines. Understanding the context of the Martens
clause is important in international humanitarian law. However, with respect to the
issues dealt with in Chapter III of this thesis, it is the contention of the author that the
imposition of the Martens clause is not necessary but serves as an elaboration on what
would happen if a Convention or a treaty remains quiet on a matter.

D. Contemporary Developments in International Humanitarian Law
The status of international humanitarian law and customary law principles are of
great importance and has been dealt with extensively. It is important to differentiate
between treaty obligations by the parties in this respect and obligations arising from a
customary norm of humanitarian law. In addition, the principles of humanitarian law
establish that even if war is illegal, States have restraints on how to conduct those
wars. Therefore, the illegality of the use of force does not negate the application of
international humanitarian law.
Under international humanitarian law rules of law exist that States are obliged to
respect - jus in bello. These rules relate to the conduct of hostilities (means and
methods of warfare) and the protection of non-combatants. These rules are found in
the Hague Conventions, the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as the two
additional protocols adopted in 1977, referred to earlier.
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Of the instruments noted above, Afghanistan has ratified the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. Consequently, it is required to demonstrate that some principles found in the
Hague Convention (IV) and/or the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
reflect norms of customary international law which are to be adhered to by all States.
Since, the United States ratified both the Hague Convention (IV) and the Geneva
Conventions, when there is a treaty provision that binds the parties it will be used to
elaborate the obligations of that instrument. When one of the parties to the conflict is
not a party to the Convention or treaty, it will be shown that some of the principles
embodied in the provisions of those Conventions or treaties, to which one or the other
is not a party to, reflect norms of customary international law.
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CHAPTER III: International Humanitarian Law

A. Nature of the Conflict in Afghanistan
This thesis argues and assumes throughout the text that the conflict in Afghanistan
is that of an international armed conflict. However, it is worth noting that tribunals
dealing with issues revolving around the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity have extended many of the protections afforded to civilians in
international armed conflicts to that of civilians in non-international armed
conflicts. 223 Relevant to this discussion is the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) that dealt with a non-international conflict in Rwanda.
While the ICTR did not have the “jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes generally, it is
empowered to prosecute domestic crimes against civilians in the form of crimes
against humanity or violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.” 224
The conflict in Afghanistan is not an internal matter; it is an international armed
conflict to which the full scope of jus ad bellum and jus in bello should be applied. It
is an international armed conflict because it involves two States: the United States of
America and the State of Afghanistan. 225 An international armed conflict occurs when
one or more States uses force against the territorial integrity of another State, which is
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recognized by it as a belligerent act. 226 Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, deals specifically with international armed conflicts. 227 Article
1(3) of that Protocol states that it applies to “the situations referred to in Article 2
common to those Conventions,” 228 which includes inter alia “all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” 229
The Preamble of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 recalls
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by stating that States are under the obligation “to
refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 230

B. Status of Combatants
In the Afghanistan, the following are the parties involved in the armed conflict:
United States, its allies, and the opposition forces against Taliban and al-Qaida forces.
Soldiers of the United States army, and all those serving as its allies, serving in
Afghanistan clearly qualify as combatants in this conflict. The Taliban forces
evidently qualify as combatants in accordance with Article 4(A)(1) of Geneva
Convention (III), which refers to “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
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forces.” 231 Article 4 specifically deals with who is to be considered as a lawful
combatant, and thus prisoners of war once captured by the enemy forces. 232 The
guidelines on who is to be regarded as a combatant are set in Article 4 in subparagraphs (1) to (6) of paragraph A. It is arguable whether al-Qaida forces qualify as
combatants. The United States arguments regarding al-Qaida members not being
regarded as combatants stems from the following arguments: first, that they do not
have a fixed distinctive sign (in accordance with Article 4(A)(2)(b));233 second, they
did not carry arms openly (in accordance with Article 4 (A)(2)(c));234 and third, they
did not respect the laws of war (in accordance with Article 4(A)(2)(d)). 235 The
assumption that al-Qaida forces qualify as combatants is based on Article 4(A)(3)
which addresses “[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.” 236 Article 4 (A)
states “[p]risoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the
enemy,” 237 the keyword is “one”. The categories are demonstrated in subparagraphs
(1) to (6); therefore, al-Qaida forces do not need to meet the requirements under
subparagraph (2), as the United States contends, if they already meet the requirements
of any of the other subparagraphs.

C. Application of Treaty Law: the Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 entered into force on 21 October 1950. Parties
to the conflict have ratified it, Afghanistan on 26 September 1956, and the United
231
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States on 2 August 1955. This illustrates the parties’ treaty obligations regarding the
conflict. There is also the argument outlined in Chapter II of this thesis regarding
certain articles within those Conventions that have been regarded as customary
international law. The Geneva Conventions, as a whole, are also regarded as having
reached the status of customary international law. 238 However, one should point out
that since all parties to the conflict are party to the Geneva Conventions, the argument
on their customary status is not needed.
The case involving Nicaragua and the United States, Military and Paramilitary
Activities239 demonstrates how international humanitarian law was violated by the
United States. The International Court of Justice was of the opinion that the United
States was not liable for violations of international humanitarian law. However, it was
decided that by the production of a manual by the CIA entitled Operaciones
sicologicas en Guerra de guerrillas (Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare)
and giving it out to the Contras, the United States has encouraged acts that are
inconsistent with general principles of humanitarian law but was not found imputable
to the acts. Those acts included killing, raping, wounding and kidnapping citizens of
Nicaragua, yet the Court was of the view that financing, organizing, training,
supplying and equipping the Contras was in itself insufficient (based on the evidence
submitted) to attribute the acts. The Court pointed out, in paragraph 115 that all those
acts do not show that “the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the
acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the Applicant State.” 240
It further clarified that those kinds of acts could have been committed beyond the
United States control. Thus, summing up to state that for the United States to be found
237
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legally responsible for the acts, proof that the United States exercised effective control
of those operations (military or paramilitary) is needed, concluding that the Contras
remain to be responsible for the acts they take. However, the Court had took notice
that the United States was obligated under Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to
‘respect and ensure respect’ for those Conventions, “an obligation which, in the
Court’s view, did not derive only from the Conventions themselves” 241 but in fact is
derived “from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions
merely give specific expressions.”242 In the Court’s judgment it “ma[d]e a major
contribution to consolidating the status of humanitarian law as it faces the challenged
of the world today.” 243
In relation to this, the Taliban could be viewed to have also encouraged acts
contrary to the general principles of humanitarian law. The issue of importance is how
much control did the Taliban have over al-Qaida? As previously mentioned in
Chapter I, if they are distinguishable from one another, then the test of effective
control in the above case could be applied. 244 Afghanistan could still be responsible
for the acts under this test but the counter measures could still not justify the use of
force. As previously indicated by reference to the U.S. Diplomatic & Consular Staff in
Tehran case, 245 post hoc ratification of non-state activities could hold the state
responsible for the acts. 246
Finally, the Geneva Conventions will be used in this chapter concerning the
section where the law is elaborated when discussing different violations of
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international humanitarian law that took place, and continue to take place in reference
to the armed conflict in Afghanistan.

D. Application of Customary International Law

1. Hague Conventions
The 1899 Hague Convention (II) deals with regulations concerning the laws and
customs of war on land and entered into force on 4 September 1900. 247 The United
States ratified it on 9 April 1902. The 1910 Hague Convention (IV) dealing with also
regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land entered into force 26
January 1910. 248 The United States ratified it on 27 November 1909.
Those Conventions’ provisions reflect customary and international humanitarian
law. Regarding Afghanistan not being a party to those Conventions, and due to the
inclusion of the ‘general participation clause’ discussed earlier, 249 it does not matter
the rules contained within the Hague Conventions, with special reference to the
Hague Convention (IV) have evolved into customary international law and thus
binding on the parties to the conflict. 250

2. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Neither the United States nor Afghanistan are party to Protocol I, 251 however, the
argument is that certain provisions reflect norms of customary international law, and
thus binding on all. Discussed in Chapter II, in the section dealing with ‘Customary
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International Humanitarian Law’, is a more in depth overview of the application of
customary law.
Regarding the application of provisions from Protocol I that reflect customary law
norms, it will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis when dealing with the six
categories of violations that this thesis is focusing on. However, it is essential to note
that Protocol I was the first instrument to codify the customary law principle of
proportionality. 252
Protocol I can also be applied to the armed forces of States that ratified it. Those
include some of the allies of the United States in the conflict in Afghanistan, for
example Canadian, British and Norwegian forces.

E. Violations of International Humanitarian Law by Parties to the Conflict
In this section, an elaboration on four possible violations of international
humanitarian norms will be examined. The first two issues concerns the obligations
on part of the United States and its allies in the conflict; the first regarding the alleged
violation of the principle prohibiting the indiscriminate attacks of civilians (with the
conditions outlined) in humanitarian law, the second relates to the treatment of
prisoners of war by the United States. The second two issues concerns the alleged
violations of international humanitarian law by the Taliban; first by placing civilians
near military targets, and second by taking over hospitals for military purposes.
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1. Indiscriminate Attacks
Indiscriminate attacks or bombing involves the raiding of cities, towns or places
with no distinction as to whether the object is civilian, military objective, civilian
population or combatants. 253 In other words it refers to attacks where there is no
distinction made. 254 While, the Hague Convention (IV) prohibits the bombing of
places such as towns or villages, which are undefended in Article 25, 255 this was later
developed to make the intentional attack on civilians illegal. 256 Geneva Convention
(IV) further came to provide for a regime that specifically affords more protection to
civilians in international armed conflicts. 257 Geneva Convention (IV) further prohibits
the use of military force on civilian hospitals under all circumstances in Article 18. 258
Discussion on the status of hospitals and the protection that is afforded to them in
international humanitarian law will appear in the last section of this chapter.
There are no specific treaty provisions related to carpet-bombing of cities or other
damage techniques both being methods of indiscriminate attacks in the Geneva
Conventions. 259 However, as stated by the ICTY in the Kupreskic case, “attacks, even
when they are directed against legitimate military targets, are unlawful if conducted
using indiscriminate means or methods of warfare, or in such a way as to cause
indiscriminate damage to civilians.” 260 Furthermore, the protection of civilian
populations and sparing civilian causalities are within the norms of customary
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international law. 261 This is based on three main and interrelated concepts. The first
dealing with the obligation to distinguish between military objectives or targets and
civilians, 262 the second the prohibition of directly attacking civilians, 263 and the third
that the attacks must be both necessary and proportional to advance a military
objective that is legitimate. 264 Those concepts discussed are elaborated upon in
different “international conventions, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, U.S.
military law, and other significant international efforts to codify the customary norms
of humanitarian law. Notably, Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions,
which came into force in 1977, codifies in treaty form many of these customary
international legal principles.” 265 Indiscriminate attacks of non-military objectives as
a method of warfare is therefore a violation of customary international law.
Additionally, the Kupreskic case further illustrates that:
These principles have to some extent been spelled out in Articles 57
and 58 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977. Such provisions, it
261
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would seem, are now part of customary international law, not only
because they specify and flesh out general pre-existing norms, but also
because they do not appear to be contested by any State, including
those which have not ratified the Protocol. Admittedly, even these two
provisions leave a wide margin of discretion to belligerents by using
language that might be regarded as leaving the last word to the
attacking party. Nevertheless this is an area where the “elementary
considerations of humanity” rightly emphasised by the International
Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel, Nicaragua and Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cases should be fully used when
interpreting and applying loose international rules, on the basis that
they are illustrative of a general principle of international law.
More specifically, recourse might be had to the celebrated Martens
Clause which, in the authoritative view of the International Court of
Justice, has by now become part of customary international law. True,
this Clause may not be taken to mean that the “principles of humanity”
and the “dictates of public conscience ” have been elevated to the rank
of independent sources of international law, for this conclusion is
belied by international practice. However, this Clause enjoins , as a
minimum, reference to those principles and dictates any time a rule of
international humanitarian law is not sufficiently rigorous or precise:
in those instances the scope and purport of the rule must be defined
with reference to those principles and dictates. In the case under
discussion, this would entail that the prescriptions of Articles 57 and
58 (and of the corresponding customary rules) must be interpreted so
as to construe as narrowly as possible the discretionary power to attack
belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand the protection
accorded to civilians. 266
Additionally, the minimum standards that parties to the conflict have to ensure are
outlined within common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Regarding
indiscriminate attacks this would violate the minimum standards that have to be
observed by the Parties to the conflict, specifically referring to Article 3(1)(a)
(dealing with violence to life and person in reference to those who are not taking an
active part in hostilities, e.g. civilians) and 3(2) (dealing with the protection and care
of the wounded and sick). 267
The Hague Convention (IV) was referred to above as it further illustrates the
treatment of civilians and further elaborates on the minimum protection that should be
266
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afforded under common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. 268 Although this article
states that it is applied to ‘non international armed conflicts’ in different situations it
was seen to apply to international armed conflicts as well. 269 Additionally, the trial
chamber of the ICTY in the Martic case stated the following:
The prohibition against attacking the civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, and the general principle limiting the
means and methods of warfare . . . emanate from the elementary
considerations of humanity [which “also derive from the ‘Martens
clause’”] which constitute the foundation of the entire body of
international humanitarian law applicable to all armed conflicts. 270
Evidently, this further indicates that death of civilian populations is a violation of
customary international law. The nature of indiscriminate attacks is that it does not
differentiate between what is a military objective and what is not. It indiscriminately
attacks different objects.
Indiscriminate attacks become the subject of questioning since it explicitly affects
the civilian population. 271 Humanitarian norms lay down that only military objectives
can be bombarded, 272 and civilians attacked when the attack has a military advantage
that outweighs the damage caused. 273 The important issue here is that of
proportionality. As noted earlier Protocol I was the first instrument to codify the
customary law principle of proportionality. 274
Article 48 of Protocol I deals with the obligation to differentiate between military
objectives and civilian objects and only allows States to direct their operations against
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military objectives. 275 The United States had held that Article 48 is a “codification of
the customary practice of nations, and therefore binding on all.” 276 Attacks that do not
differentiate between military and civilian objectives is a violation of the core
principles of humanitarian norms prohibiting attacking civilian objects; with no
military objective, and infrastructure essential for their existence. 277 Although
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims in
international armed conflict is not binding upon Afghanistan and the United States
since they are not parties to it, some rules contained within it are considered to
customary norms of humanitarian law. Article 51 (4) [concerned most with the means
and method of warfare that is indiscriminate] and (5) [specifically directed towards
what is known as carpet bombing and excessive effects in relation to the anticipated
military advantage] 278 are one of those provisions that express the widely accepted
protection that should be afforded to civilian populations in time of conflict. 279 Of
specific relevance are Article 51(4) (c) and 51 (5) by stating the following:
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
(a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats
as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
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combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 280
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 additional Protocols are seen to
“have provided the legal protection for the inviolability of civilians as part of the law
of war.” 281 In the commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977, one of the general
remarks made regarding Article 51, is that it “is one of the most important articles in
the Protocol. It explicitly confirms the customary rule that innocent civilians must be
kept outside hostilities as far as possible and enjoy general protection against danger
arising from hostilities.” 282 Furthermore, while there has been a controversy towards
applying those kinds of protections to civilians in non-international armed conflicts,
the tribunals in the 1990s has expanded the civilian protection law. 283 In the Martic
Case, the Trial Chamber held that “the rule that the civilian population as such as well
as individual citizens shall not be the object of attack is a fundamental rule of
international law applicable to all armed conflicts … irrespective of their
characterization as international or non-international.” 284 This reinforces that civilian
population shall not be the object of attack by the parties to the conflict, to which the
Senior Legal Advisor in the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor stated that “attacks on
[civilians and] civilian objects are prohibited as a matter of customary law in all
conflicts.” 285
With specific reference to paragraph 4 prohibiting indiscriminate attacks, and
subsection (c) dealing with the employment of certain methods or means of combat
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that are indiscriminate, it was generally recognized that some weapons used in
conflicts “by their very nature have an indiscriminate effect.”
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In addition, the

power of the weapon itself is important when assessing whether there is a violation of
indiscriminate attack where the example was given that “if a 10 ton bomb is used to
destroy a single building, it inevitable that the effects will be very extensive and will
annihilate or damage neighboring buildings, while a less powerful missile would
suffice to destroy the building.” 287
Accordingly, the use of cluster bombs is therefore a violation of this provision
since it does not differentiate between military and civilian objectives and it has an
inhumane nature of killing. It is documented that the United States and its allies are
using cluster bombs in the conflict in Afghanistan. 288 Their usage poses grave dangers
to the civilian population to which Human Rights Watch is of the position that cluster
bombs should not used “until governments can establish either that a technical
solution is possible or that new restrictions and requirements regarding their use can
be effective. In the event that cluster bombs are used in Afghanistan, they should not
be used near populated areas.” 289 Cluster bombs were first developed by the United
States during the Vietnam War. 290 The civilian population is endangered by the usage
of cluster bombs in two main ways. One that this bomb is considered,
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[A]n ‘area weapon,’ so called because a single dispenser can spread its
cluster bombs over a huge area, from one to five football fields. Each
of the small bombs contains over a hundred tiny pieces of shrapnel,
which can cause physical injury at especially long distances. If
dropped on a military target in a populated area, cluster bombs,
because of their enormous footprint and because of each small bomb’s
terrific destructive power, almost certainly will kill, maim, or
otherwise wound a large number of innocent civilians. 291
Second, around “five to thirty percent of the small cluster bombs are duds. But they
can remain dangerous years after launch; a slight vibration can detonate them.” 292
Besides poison gases, biological and nuclear weapons, cluster bombs “[are] perhaps
more dangerous to civilians than any other weapon in modern warfare.” 293 The
United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) “indicated that [the]
coalition forces provided information on 103 cluster bomb strikes and that 1,210
CBU-87B dispensers were dropped on 78 of these sites, totaling 244,420 cluster
bomblets.” 294 With the assumption that the dud rate is seven percent 17,109 cluster
bombs remain on the grounds of Afghanistan and continue are considered to remain
dangerous. 295
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Finally, the provisions from Protocol I quoted above, 296 illustrate what
indiscriminate attacks encompass. Article 51(4)(c) is especially important as it
addresses the usage of a ‘method or means of combat’ that have the ‘nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction’. 297 It would
appear that cluster bombs fall into this category.
Furthermore, in a report by the United States Department of Defense to the
Congress regarding the conduct of war in the Persian Gulf, it was stated that:
While the prohibition contained in Article 23(g) generally refers to
intentional destruction or injury, it also precludes collateral damage of
civilian objects or injury to non combatant civilians that is clearly
disproportionate to the military advantage gained in the attack of
military objectives… Hague IV was found to be part of customary
international law in the course of war crimes trials following World
War II, and continues to be so regarded. An uncodified but similar
provision is the principle of proportionality. 298
The United States is therefore aware of its obligation under international
humanitarian law. However in this report the United States recognized that the Iraqi
government had intentionally installed civilian populations and objects as ‘shields for
military objects’. Consequently, further recognition by the United States is seen that
certain principles of customary law are codified in Protocol I, special reference to
Article 48 and 49(1). 299 Finally, in the report it is stated that although the United
States in 1987 had declined to become a State party to Protocol I, nor has Iraq, “the
language of Articles 48 and 49(1) (except for the erroneous use of the word ‘attacks’)
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is generally regarded as a codification of the customary practice of nations, and
therefore binding on all.” 300
The United States argues that in the language of Protocol I, specifically Article
52(3) 301 stating that “[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated
to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school,
is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed
not to be so used,” 302 is not codified as customary international law. It further states
that this provision:
Shifts the burden for determining the precise use of an object from the
party controlling that object (and therefore in possession of the facts as
to its use) to the party lacking such control and facts, i.e., from
defender to attacker. This imbalance ignores the realities of war in
demanding a degree of certainty of an attacker that seldom exists in
combat. It also encourages a defender to ignore its obligation to
separate the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
objects from military objectives, as the Government of Iraq illustrated
during the Persian Gulf War. 303
Human Rights Watch’s position regarding dual-use objects is that “in determining
whether dual-use objects are valid military targets, the impact on civilians must be
carefully weighed against the military advantage served; all ways of minimizing the
impact on civilians must be considered; and attacks should not be undertaken if the
civilian harm outweighs the definite military advantage.” 304 Therefore, leaving a way
for the assessing of civilian harm by the attacking party. This could indicate that if
civilian harm does not outweigh that of the military advantage, thus attacks on
civilians are permissible in this sense only if there exists a military objective.
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Facts of violations that took place and applicability of the law:
The following incidents are used to show some United States attacks that
involved the loss of civilian lives in Afghanistan. The common aspect between the
incidents is their location away from military objects. Carpet-bombing the suburbs of
Kabul and Kandahar that involved the below mentioned incidents, violated the
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations and objects with no
evident military objectives. It is worth noting that the United States did not defend its
position in most of these cases.
a. The bombing of a village near Kabul’s airport on 13 October 2001. 305
The United States 2,000-pound smart bomb missed a target at Kabul’s airport and
instead hit a nearby village. 306 The Pentagon admitted that it was a mistake on behalf
of its forces that had led to the death of four civilian lives. 307 A statement made by the
Defense Department expressed regret for the loss of civilian life and that “preliminary
indications are that the accident occurred from a targeting process error.” 308 The
bomb that was guided by a satellite had missed the intended target “because incorrect
coordinates for the position of the helicopter were entered into a targeting system, a
Pentagon source said.” 309
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b. The bombing of the ICRC compound in Kabul, containing food for the
disabled and widows, on 16 October 16 2001. 310
The United States air force bombed an International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) compound in Kabul causing the injury to one of its employees. 311 According
to ICRC sources, the compound is located two kilometers away from the airport and
is “like all other ICRC facilities in the country, it is clearly distinguishable from the
air by the large red cross painted against a white background on the roof of each
building.” 312 The Pentagon admitted that the bombing was done mistakenly “which
military planners had thought was being used by the Taliban.” 313
The reaction of the ICRC was furious stating that compound was clearly marked
as a facility for civilian in which Robert Moni, the head of the Red Cross delegation
in Kabul stated that “it is definitely a civilian target. In addition to that, it is clearly
marked ICRC warehouse.” 314 Parties to a conflict are under the obligation to respect
the emblems of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and to take all the necessary
precautions to avoid harming civilians under international humanitarian law.
c. Civilian homes bombed on 18 and 28 October 2001. 315
The 18 October incident relates to the series of raids the United States Air Force
has been engaged in connection with striking at residential areas in Kabul. 316 Five
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members whom belong to the same family were killed when the United States
bombed six houses in the South Eastern area of Kalae Zaman Khan. 317 The incident
on 28 October involved further air raids on Kabul that led to the death of at least ten
civilians, eight of which were children. 318 Other sources indicate there were at least
thirteen civilians, 319 and others say that more than ten civilians were killed. 320
d. The bombing of a Red Crescent medical clinic, in Kandahar, on 31 October
2001.321
The above relates to the incident in Kandahar, where at least eleven civilians were
killed as a result of the air raids by the United States where the bombs hit a Red
Crescent medical clinic. 322 As much as fifteen have been reported dead according to
other sources. 323 One of the physicians who survived, Dr. Obaidullah stated that, “this
building has nothing to do with the Taliban and the military.” 324
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e. The bombing of a village, Chowkar Karez, around 40 Km away from
Kandahar that caused the death of at least 25 persons. 325 (Reported by Human
Rights Watch) 326
The events in the village of Chowkar Karez on 22 October 2001, involved more
United States bombs that were raided on the village and caused the substantial loss of
life. Human Rights Watch interviewed witnesses none of whom “knew of Taliban or
Al-Qaida positions in the area of the attack.” 327 Sidney Jones, the Asia Director of
Human Rights Watch made the following statement: “if there were military targets in
the area, we'd like to know what they were,” 328 he further stated that “this is the
second instance in less than a week in which we've documented substantial civilian
casualties from U.S. bombing raids. The Pentagon has got to do more to avoid these
deaths.” 329 The United States did not reply to this enquiry.
All those incidents referred to above deal with civilian casualties and evident nonmilitary objects and objectives present. As discussed earlier Articles 25 of the Hague
Convention (IV) 330 prohibit the bombing of towns or villages, which are not
defended. Regarding the argument that those towns or villages were situated next to
military targets, Human Rights Watch (a U.S. based human rights organization) has
asked the United States to state what those targets were in a couple of incidents. 331
Mentioned above is Article 18 of Geneva Convention (IV), 332 which prohibits the
use of force, in all circumstances, on civilian hospitals. By bombing villages, homes,
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Red Crescent medical center and Red Cross compound and warehouse the United
States is in violation of its obligations under those instruments. Furthermore,
international humanitarian law puts an obligation that all parties to the conflict respect
Red Crescent and Red Cross and to “take all the precautions needed to avoid harming
civilians.” 333 The minimum standards that should be adhered to, elaborated in
common Article 3, have been breached. This is since those raids and bombs that have
resulted in deaths and injuries caused ‘violence to life and person’ 334 and put the
wounded and sick at risk while Article 3(2) obligates States to collect and care for
them. 335
As previously established, attacks are considered indiscriminate if used on
civilian populations with no military objective present. As indicated civilians can only
be attacked if the military advantage outweighs that of the damage caused. Although
the United States argues that it does not intend to harm or kill civilians, they are still
violating international humanitarian law by bombing locations with no evident
military objectives and causing civilian deaths. This is seen through the incidents
above where civilian villages and homes were bombarded.
The United States was obligated to distinguish between the military objectives
they want to attack and ensure that those attacks were necessary and proportional for
the advancement of a military objective that is legitimate. As discussed earlier there is
evidence that sparing civilian casualties is a customary international law norm, to
which there is an obligation to distinguish between military and civilian targets, of
prohibiting the direct attacks on civilians and of ensuring that there is a legitimate
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military objective to be advanced by the attack, thus ensuring that both necessity and
proportionality exist. 336
Those incidents discussed above indicate that indiscriminate attacks or bombings
with no evident military objective were being carried out. There was no indication on
part of the United States to show that its forces attacked those areas because there
was a legitimate military objective. 337 Consequently, the United States is responsible
for violating international humanitarian law by indiscriminately attacking targets
with no military objectives. The United States Supreme Court had previously
acknowledged that civilians are to be afforded special protections in armed
conflicts, 338 to which it noted that the Japanese commander of the forces in the
Second World War had had an “affirmative duty to take such measures as were
within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners and the
civilian population.”339 As outlined earlier on, the jurisprudence of the ICTY has
expanded significantly and strengthened the protection of civilians during armed
conflicts. 340
The Martic case for example, stated a clear rule that “the prohibition on attacking
the civilian population as such, or individual civilians [is] part of this corpus of
customary law.” 341 The Kupreskic case made another pioneer statement that “the
protection of civilians” during armed conflicts is “the bedrock of modern
336
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humanitarian law.” 342 Although in the incidents mentioned above the argument that
they were direct attacks can not be made due to the current insufficient evidence, the
issue of relevance to the cases cited above is the special protection that is due to
civilians in armed conflicts, and the reinstatement of “the customary rule that
innocent civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as possible and enjoy general
protection against danger arising from hostilities.” 343
Finally, almost all of the ICTY judgments concluded that “the victims are part of
a civilian population and individuals are then held criminally responsible for attacks
on those civilians, either as crimes against humanity or war crimes.” 344 In the Martic
case, he was accused of bombing civilians in Zagreb, 345 while in the Karadzic and
Mladic case, they were being indicted for bombing civilians in Sarajevo. 346 In
relation to the conflict in Afghanistan, Harvard Law School Professor and president
of the American Society of International Law, Anne-Marie Slaughter, argues that
United States “targeting decisions must have included specific restrictions to protect
civilians and avoid civilian objects, even at the potential cost of U.S. casualties.”347 It
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is further pointed to the statements made by Amnesty International that calls on the
Unites States to “demonstrate that all possible steps were taken to protect against
civilian casualties.” 348

2. The Issue of Prisoners of War at Guantanamo Bay (Camp X-Ray)
The Geneva Convention (III) specifically deals with the treatment of prisoners of
war. 349 In accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, if doubt arises as to whether
individuals captured would qualify as prisoners of war within the meaning of Article
4 of the Convention, then until a competent tribunal determines their status, they are
to enjoy the protections afforded to them under the convention. 350 Having examined
the status of combatants in this conflict at the beginning of this Chapter and once they
fall prisoners of war, this section further illustrates the treatment that should be
afforded to them until their status is determined, which is a process they must not be
denied.
In relation to the possibility that a treaty or convention does not protect certain
individuals, the Martens Clause discussed in Chapter II becomes important. Its
objective was to address cases that the convention did not deal with insisting that it
should not “be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.” 351 It further
leaves the protection of those individuals to be under “the rule of the principles of the
law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,
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from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.” 352 Article 142
of Geneva Convention (III) expressed the same general idea of the Martens Clause. 353
The laws of humanity should be the guidance in case the argument is made that the
Geneva Conventions do not cover the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions lay down the minimum standards
of protection that extends to “members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause.” 354 Those individuals are to be treated humanely in all circumstances under this
provision. 355 In reference to the same Article, there is a prohibition of cruel treatment,
torture, and humiliating and degrading treatment. 356 Furthermore, in order for a
sentence over any individual to be made it has to be passed by a competent Court or
tribunal “affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.” 357
There are also guidelines when evacuating prisoners of war, where it “shall
always be effected humanely and in conditions similar to those for the forces of the
Detaining Power in their changes of station.”358 While in internment they are to enjoy
a climate that is not injurious to them, 359 and shall be “quartered under conditions as
favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same
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area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the
prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.” 360
Finally, Article 118 of the Geneva Convention (III) guides the time when the
prisoners of war are to be released or repatriated. It provides that “prisoners of war
shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.” 361 As illustrated earlier, and in accordance with Article 5 of Geneva
Convention (III), detainees being held by the detaining power shall be afforded the
protections of the convention until their status is determined to be that of a prisoner of
war or not. Those protections that should be afforded to them most importantly are to
be treated humanely, as expressed in common Article 3, and specifically Article 13 of
the same convention. 362 Other protections include the entitlement of respect to their
persons and honor in all circumstance. 363

Facts of violations that took place and applicability of the law:
The Pakistani authorities surrendered those captured and held in their prisons,
from Taliban and al-Qaida fighters to the United States. On 7 January 2002, a claim
was brought forward to the Supreme Court in Peshwar that Pakistan’s surrendering of
Arabs to the United States is a violation of Islamic law, Pakistani constitution and
human rights. 364 Before the Court had the chance to deal with the case, the Americans
flew those captured fighters to Guantanamo Bay, 365 and where they remained held at
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“Camp X-Ray”. By the end of February 2002 around three hundred detainees
remained to be held at Camp X-Ray. 366 By September 2002 the figure reached around
six hundred. Guantanamo is not on United States territory and therefore the detainees
are not automatically provided with basic constitutional rights. 367
Regarding the treatment of those detained, while they were being transported, and
the humane treatment that they are supposed to be receiving under international
humanitarian law in general and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in specific, 368
officials from the Pentagon, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, stated that:
A large contingent of military police -- outnumbering the prisoners
two to one -- was on the flight armed with stun guns and authorized to
sedate any prisoners, if necessary. The detainees were to be chained to
their seats for the entire flight, they said. ‘After September 11th, a little
paranoia is a good thing,’ said Steve Lucas, a spokesman for the U.S.
Southern Command in Miami, which oversees the base at Guantanamo
Bay. 369
The treatment of the prisoners was objected to by international organization such
as Amnesty International. 370 Amnesty International Secretary General Irene Khan sent
a letter to Secretary of Defense Rumsfield stating, “‘the hooding of suspects in
detention generally may constitute cruel treatment.’ The organization also said that
sedating prisoners for other than medical purposes would be a breach of international
standards.”371 In a statement made by the organization regarding this issue, it said:
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Hooding suspects in detention may violate international standards
prohibiting ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ treatment. The standards
emphasize that the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ covers mental
as well as physical abuse, including holding detainees in conditions
that deprive them, even temporarily, of the use of any of their natural
senses such as sight or hearing or awareness of time or place. The
hooding or blindfolding of suspects during interrogation also violates
international standards. 372
In the letter mentioned above to Donald Rumsfield, Irene Khan further pointed out
that the States that are parties to the Convention against Torture 373 are obligated to
observe its provisions. She made a special reference to one of the Committee Against
Torture’s recent statements that condemned the 11 September attacks. In this
statement, the Committee reinstated the non-derogable provisions on the convention
and that States that are parties to it have to adhere to those provisions. 374 She further
comments that:
The Committee cited in particular Articles 2 (whereby ‘no exceptional
circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification of
torture’), 15 (prohibiting confessions extorted by torture being
admitted in evidence, except against the torturer) and 16 (prohibiting
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) as three such
provisions which must be observed in all circumstances. We trust that
you will take all necessary measures to ensure that these provisions are
fully adhered to in the treatment of those in US custody following
military operations in Afghanistan, and that no one will be subjected to
interrogation techniques which breach such standards. We would also
appreciate receiving clarification of the legal status of those
detained. 375
As for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), although on 18
January 2002, delegates from the ICRC were allowed to visit the detainees, it was the
position of the organization that they will not “comment publicly on the treatment of
372
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detainees or on conditions of detention. The ICRC delegates will discuss their
findings directly with the detaining authorities, submit their recommendations to
them, and encourage them to take the measures needed to solve any problems of
humanitarian concern.” 376 Furthermore, officials from the Pentagon had given orders
to different news agencies “not to transmit pictures of the hooded detainees being
moved onto the plane, citing concern that such images may be violations of the
dignity of the prisoners under international laws governing the treatment of
prisoners.” 377 Those agencies had agreed not to do so until permission was given to
them. 378
Those transported to Guantanamo Bay were being shackled and had goggles,
earmuffs, masks, and gloves on. This technique is called ‘sensory deprivation’, which
received contempt internationally and from human rights organization. 379 Jim West,
Amnesty International’s Chief medical officer stated that the photographs showing
this ‘sensory deprivation’ technique being used “were reminiscent of torture methods
used in Eastern Europe in the 1970s.” 380 The United States justified the goggles and
earmuffs usage by stating that it was for security measures. West further stated that,
“there is no obvious explanation of these measures except an attempt to degrade the
man.” 381 According to BBC News “another human rights group said that not being
able to see, hear, smell or touch would leave the prisoners feeling disorientated and
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suffering from hallucinations.” 382 Those measures violate principles of humanity and
those found in Geneva Convention (III), namely Articles 3, 13, 14 and 20. 383
Although as will be indicated later by official statements that the United States had
refused to grant those detained the status of prisoners of war it argued that the
standards laid down in the Geneva Conventions are being adhered to.
Another issue of utmost concern is that of the cells that the detainees were being
held in at Camp X-Ray384 before being transferred to cells in Camp Delta that
arguably provide for more humane conditions. In Amnesty International’s own
comments, at Camp X-Ray “at eight-by-eight feet, the cells are below US standards
for ordinary prisoners.” 385 The iron cells are out in the open space allowing the sun
rays all throughout the day and guards to view the detainees from all four sides, while
American officials call them cells, American journalists are referring to them as
‘animal cages’. 386 Douglass W. Cassel, Director of the Center for International
Human Rights at Northwestern University’s School of Law, comments that the
treatment of the prisoners by the United States is mixed. 387 That although they are
being offered medical care, food, sanitation and provided with towels to pray on “the
prisoners live and sleep in wire mesh cages, eight feet square, albeit with metal roofs.
How would Americans react if our soldiers were kept in cages?” 388 He further states
that “Rumsfeld’s next words were even more poorly chosen. ‘They will be handled
not as prisoners of war, because they're not, but as unlawful combatants.’ This legal

382

Id.
Geneva Convention (III), supra note 6. See Appendix G, for the full text of the articles.
384
See Appendix C, for a sketch of how the cells looked like.
385
BBC News, Prison Camp Pictures Spark Protests (Jan. 20, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1771000/1771687.stm.
386
Seree lel Ghaya (Highly Confidential), supra note 364.
387
Douglass W. Cassel Jr., Tempest in a Cage, Not a Teapot, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN ,
Jan. 24, 2002, at 6, available at LEXIS, Legal News Library.
388
Id.
383

87

conclusion was, at the very least, premature.” 389 The United States President
commented the same when he stated that the detainees at Guantanamo “will not be
treated as prisoners of war; they’re illegal combatants.” 390
The conditions of the cells that the prisoners are currently being held in are an
evident violation of Articles 22 and 25 of Geneva Convention (III). 391 The former
dealing with internment of prisoners of war to be in a favorable climate, while the
latter specifically states that, “prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as
favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same
area.” 392 Are the United States forces quartered in the same conditions as those of the
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay? The answer is evidently to the negative. The
internment conditions of the prisoners are in violation of the United States’ treaty
obligations. As stated earlier on, the detainees are to enjoy the protections afforded to
them under the Convention until their status is determined in accordance with Article
5 of the Geneva Convention (III). 393
Those captured in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who fought against the United States
and its allies in Afghanistan, have the right to enjoy the protection afforded to them
under international humanitarian law. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
applies also to members of the armed forces who have laid their arms, which then
would apply, to prisoners of war. This article, as previously outlined, lays down the
minimum standards that should be adhered to and further recognizes the obligation to
observe humanity. The rules governing the treatment of hors de combats in this article
refers to an obligation on the parties to humanely treat them without distinction, to not
389
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violate their right to life and person, not to torture or treat them cruelly, not to
degrade, humiliate or perform acts that would violate their personal dignity and
further more not to pass sentences and carry out executions without a recognized
court order. 394 Furthermore, humane treatment and respect of ones person and honor
is further protected in Articles 13 and 14 of Geneva Conventions (III). 395
A more specific treaty obligation in Geneva Convention (III) is that of Article
4.396 It lays down the guidelines as to who qualifies to be declared a prisoner of war.
The main arguments put forward by the United States relate to the conditions in
Article 4 (A)(2)(b) and (c). 397 They state that militias or organized resistance
movements have to fulfill certain conditions to be recognized as prisoners of war, one
of which is laid down in (b) “that of having a fixed distinction sign recognizable at a
distance,”398 and (c) “that of carrying arms openly”. 399 The United States argues that
those who fought against them in Afghanistan do not fulfill these conditions.
Therefore, it further argues that those held in Guantanamo Bay do not qualify as
prisoners of war but are considered to be terrorists or illegal combatants. However, in
response to the international criticism that the United States received after it declared
that prisoner of war status will not be given to the prisoners at Guantanamo, the
United states modified its position in early February and stated that those who fought
for Taliban would be covered by the Geneva Conventions. 400
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While questioning this provision would only be in relation to al-Qaida group, the
Taliban would fit under Article 4 (A) (1) & (3). 401 Those sub-paragraphs specifically
states that the status of prisoner of war shall be granted to “[M]embers of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces… [and to] [m]embers of regular armed forces who
profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.” 402 Therefore, whether or not the Taliban is recognized as the de facto
government of Afghanistan is not important, the armed forces of the Taliban would
still have the right to enjoy a prisoner of war status.
As for al-Qaida fighters they were considered by the United States as members of
‘other militias and members of other volunteer corps’, however the conditions laid
down in Article 4(A)(2) have to be met. While the United States have been
questioning the fulfillment of the conditions laid down in parts (b) and (c), part (d)
could further be used against al-Qaida. It states that a prisoner of war status shall be
granted if they were “conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.” 403 The question then asked is if al-Qaida was in fact responsible for
the incidents on 11 September 2001. A question that will not be dealt with since
proper attention to this issue could be best examined in a more extensive study.
The United States President had commented the following “I am looking at the
legalities involved with the Geneva Convention. In either case, however I make my
decision, these detainees will be well-treated. We are not going to call them prisoners
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of war, in either case, and the reason why is al-Qaida is not a known military.” 404 He
further stated that the prisoners “won’t be afforded prisoner-of-war status. I’ll decide
beyond that whether or not they can be noncombatants under the Geneva Convention,
or not. I’ll make that legal decision soon.” 405 All of those held in Guantanamo have
not been brought before a tribunal, to which the Secretary of Defense has commented
that there was no need for such a procedure since President Bush had determined the
lawfulness of their detention. 406 Even if those arguments are feasible, the United
States cannot unilaterally determine that those detainees do not qualify as prisoners of
war, until a competent and impartial tribunal renders such a decision. 407 Looking at
Article 5 of the above-mentioned Convention where it states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to
any of the categories enumerates in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal. 408
Additionally, Antonella Notari from the International Committee of the Red Cross
comments that the conflict in Afghanistan is that of an armed conflict, which means
that the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict. 409 She further states that this also
means that any combatant that was captured has the right to be treated as a prisoner of
war, at least until proven otherwise. 410
Therefore, under the conditions set forth in this Convention and under the United
States’ treaty obligations, it has a duty to afford all those captured the protection that
is due to them in accordance with the Convention until their status is determined. The
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United States has the obligation to ensure that a competent tribunal is established to
determine the status of those captured to be that of a prisoner of war or not. Until such
time, they are to enjoy the protections of the Convention. The minimum international
protection that should be given to them is obscured, in which they should be granted
protection as prisoners of war until their status is determined relying on the
humanitarian norm not to humiliate an enemy after a battlefield. 411 Additionally, if it
is determined that the detainees are not covered by the Convention as claimed by the
United States, they are to be treated within ‘the laws of humanity, and the dictates of
the public conscience’ as elaborated upon earlier on by the inclusion of the Martens
Clause and its customary status.
It is thought to be unclear how the United States perceives those held in its
custody at Guantanamo Bay. Although the Secretary of State, Colin Powell stated that
both Taliban and al-Qaida detainees are enjoying benefits afforded to them by the
Geneva Convention, he outlines that as a matter of international law, the Taliban are
covered by the Geneva Convention while al-Qaida are not because of their terrorist
nature and origin. 412 However, he further pointed out that they are both being treated
humanely in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 413 Yet, as seen previously,
different organizations and entities have been questioning such humane treatment.
Moreover, it is the position of the United States, expressed through its Secretary
of State, that both Taliban and al-Qaida detainees are not entitled the status of
prisoners of war. 414 In the words of the Secretary of State his remarks were as follows:
“both categories, al-Qaida and Taliban, we believe are not entitled to prisoner-of-war
410
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status; we believe they are entitled to be called unlawful combatants under the terms
of the Convention and generally accepted international law.” 415 However, it is
important to stress the American position regarding the treatment of the detainees in
which he stated that:
We will treat all human beings that we are responsible for in our
custody in a way that is dignified, without abusing them, without
humiliating them, and making sure that they get the health care they
need, access to religious activities, good nutrition, consistent with the
Geneva Convention, although there are debates as to what we are
actually required to do under the Convention with respect to Taliban
and al-Qaida. 416
The United States has therefore formally acknowledged the existence of those
humanitarian rules relating to the treatment of those under its captivity. 417 It is though
seen to further questioning whether such humane treatment should be afforded to
those not recognized as prisoners of war. Consequently, it is further reinstating its
position that the Taliban and al-Qaida members held in Guantanamo Bay are not
recognized as prisoners of war. Interestingly enough, while the Secretary of State was
seen questioning the humane treatment requirement for unlawful combatants, the
Secretary of Defense has stated three weeks before him that he was being advised,
“under the Geneva Convention, an unlawful combatant is entitled to humane
treatment. Therefore, whatever one may conclude as to how the Geneva Convention
may or may not apply, the United States is treating them -- all detainees -consistently with the principles of the Geneva Convention.” 418 This illustrates that the
American administration is confused regarding the application of the Geneva
Conventions to the situation they are facing and has been issuing conflicting
414
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statements. As stated earlier on though, the American administration altered its
position by stating that only the Taliban detainees are to enjoy the protection of the
Geneva Conventions. 419 However, President Bush decided “that the Taliban’s actions
in violating the laws of war and closely associating itself with al-Qaida had the effect
of stripping Taliban members of their rights to prisoner-of-war status.” 420
As illustrated, United States officials continue to refer to some of the detainees in
Guantanamo as ‘unlawful combatants’. Initially all detainees were considered
‘unlawful combatants’ and therefore the United States concluded that none are
privileged to enjoy the protection of the Geneva Conventions. Later on, al-Qaida
detainees were the ones referred to as ‘unlawful combatants’. This referral term has
been the cause of generating confusion to the international community. 421 Article 4 of
Geneva Convention (IV) provides for a broad protection of individuals “who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they
are not nations.” 422 The only requirement seems to be that the prisoner be a national of
a State party to the Convention. 423 Therefore, although the United States argues that
al-Qaida do not represent a State, this argument would be flawed since in the words of
the above Convention, it is likely that it covers nationals of State parties to the
Conventions. All those detained belong to countries that have ratified the Geneva
Conventions. 424 In relation to the interpretation of Geneva Conventions (III) and (IV),
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the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the ICTY have interpreted
it:
To embrace all persons who fall into enemy custody during an armed
conflict, and neither had recognized an exception for so-called
unlawful combatants…Human Rights Watch (HRW) explained that
‘nobody in enemy hands can fall outside the law,’ and prisoners
detained by an enemy in an armed conflict either are protected by the
Third Convention as prisoners of war, or by the Fourth Convention as
civilians. 425
Until today, the United States refuses to apply the Geneva Conventions to al-Qaida
detainees, refuse to grant prisoner of war status to any of the detainees, and continues
to deny the detainees the right to have their status determines by a competent tribunal
in accordance with Article 5 of Geneva Convention (III). 426
There has been discussions where the United States Secretary of Defense
proposed the setting up of military commissions to consider charges against those
held at Guantanamo Bay for their alleged terrorist activities. 427 It was further stated
that those commissions would be like a military court martial, allowing the suspects
the enjoyment of their rights and privileges. 428 Consequently, the Secretary of
Defense outlined that:
The accused will enjoy a presumption of innocence; will not be
required to testify or incriminate themselves at the trial. They will have
the ability to discover information and to obtain witnesses and
evidence needed for trial and be present at public trial. Cannot be tried
for the same offense twice. Will be provided with military defense
counsel at government expense, and will also be able to hire defense
counsel of their choosing at their expense. 429
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He further stressed that the tribunals will be impartial and fair, and that there is a
requirement of a two-thirds of the majority of the commission for the conviction of
individuals, while a unanimous vote (seven members of the commission) for the
imposition of the death penalty. 430
The commentary to Geneva Convention (III) refers to Article 5 of this Convention
that states ‘responsible authority’ which initially some States made the suggestion that
it should read ‘military tribunal’. However, it was not accepted unanimously since “it
was felt that to bring a person before a military tribunal might have more serious
consequences than a decision to deprive him of the benefits afforded by the
Convention.” 431 Furthermore, another stipulation was added in this Article indicating
that a ‘competent tribunal’ and specifically not a military tribunal would decide
regarding the status of a person. 432 Courts and tribunals that afford fewer standards
than those given by the International Criminal Court, it may be said, to be a regression
to what the international community has achieved. 433 Consequently, the order of the
White House in November “to try suspected terrorists in military tribunals with
standards inconsistent with the ICC, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977
Geneva Protocols must therefore be treated with serious apprehension and regrets.” 434
In addition, Amnesty International stated, “denying prisoners their internationally
430
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recognized rights -- including the right to a fair trial -- can constitute a war crime
under the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian law.” 435
Under the norms of international humanitarian law governing the treatment of
prisoners of war, the only kind of punishments that they could face, while in captivity,
is disciplinary sanctions articulated in Article 89 of Geneva Convention (III). 436 Those
disciplinary punishments referred to encompass one or more of the following:
payment of a fine, suspending privileges that were granted to the prisoner over the
required treatment that is provided by the Convention, ‘fatigue duties’ that do not
exceed a two hour daily period, and confinement. Article 89 further provides that
under no circumstances the disciplinary punishments be “inhuman, brutal or
dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.” 437
Furthermore, humanitarian norms establish that “prisoners of war shall be released
and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” 438 Prisoners of
war may not be punished or tried for participating in the armed conflict. 439 It therefore
becomes evident, that by the setting up of the military commissions by the United
States for trying those detained at Guantanamo Bay, the United States is continuing in
its policy of not acknowledging that those detained have prisoners of war status, but
actually attempting to try them. Prisoners of war can only be tried for the commission
of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Finally, whether or not those detainees are in fact prisoners of war is not what is
being contested here. Alternatively, the issue at hand deals with the fact that under
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humanitarian norms, they are to be treated as prisoners of war until a determination is
made regarding their status by a competent tribunal. Although the United States has
repeatedly stated that it is humanely treating the detainees, they failed to observe their
obligations under Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (III) dealing with the
determination of the status of the captive. Leading to the fact that until this date no
competent tribunal was set up to make such a determination, moreover, the President
has unilaterally decided that their detention is lawful. Who is to decide on such
issues? The President or a tribunal? Article 5 clearly states ‘a competent tribunal’. 440
A spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated that the
ICRC reaction to the decision by President Bush on determining the status of the
detainees was that it “stands by its position that people in a situation of international
conflict are considered to be prisoners of war unless a competent tribunal decides
otherwise.” 441
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recently issued provisionary
measures for a case brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights based in New
York. It found that “doubt exist as to the legal status of the Guantanamo detainees.” 442
Those measures were issued where the commission asked the United States to “take
the urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay determined by a competent tribunal.” 443 It further gave the United States thirty
days to comply with this measure. The Commission considered the importance of
issuing such measures in the current circumstances “in order to ensure that the legal
440
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status of each of the detainees is clarified and that they are afforded the legal
protections commensurate with the status that they are found to possess, which may in
no case fall below the minimum standards of non-derogable rights.” 444 It is on this
basis that the Commission directed the above request to the United States. There has
been no indication yet that the United States complied with this request. On the
contrary, the United States responded by claiming that the Inter-American
Commission does not have jurisdiction to apply international humanitarian law and
that its provisional measures were unnecessary due to the clear status of the detainees
not to be that of prisoners of war since they do not meet the required criteria to be
recognized as lawful combatants. 445
Finally, it is suggested that the United States is setting a dangerous precedent, by
selectively applying the Geneva Conventions, “for the future application and
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. In the interest of its own credibility, as well
as the future safety of its own armed forces, the U.S. government would be well
advised to reconsider its position and comply with all of its obligations under the
Conventions.” 446

3. Placing Civilians Near Military Targets
Just as international humanitarian law prohibits the intentional attack on civilians
and destruction of civilian objects, so is the placement of civilians near military
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targets to render them immune is prohibited. 447 Thus, international humanitarian law
“prohibits abuse of this prohibition: civilians and the civilian population and civilian
objects may not be used to shield a military objective from attack.” 448 Even if the
State is a victim of aggression, it shall “in no way be exempted from the obligations
incumbent upon it under treaty or customary rules of law.” 449
In the report by the United States Department of Defense following Operation
Desert Storm, the United States clarified in the report that Protocol I has provisions
that reflect principles of customary law. It specifically made reference to Articles 48
and 49(1), 450 by stating that they are “generally regarded as a codification of the
customary practice of nations, and therefore binding on all.” 451
This technique further violates the right of civilian populations, which puts them
at risk of being bombarded by the enemy’s armed forces. Therefore, the principles
found in Article 25 of the Hague Convention (IV) prohibiting the bombing of towns
or villages which are not defended are being violated by such techniques. 452
Furthermore, there is an obligation on all parties to the conflict to avoid harming
civilians. Provisions of the Hague Convention (IV) and Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention are used in the footnotes to further elaborate on the minimum requirement
that could be deduced from common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions regarding
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the protection of those who are not party to the conflict or have fallen out of it as their
status have become one of an hors de combats to be applied to civilian populations as
well.
As previously exercised by other regimes, 453 the Taliban was alleged to having
placed civilians near military targets to hide behind the civilian population and avoid
being attacked. The action by the Taliban of moving civilians near military targets, or
moving themselves to shield within the civilian population, which in turn increased
civilian causalities is a violation of not only international humanitarian law but also a
State’s responsibility to protect its own nationals.
Reports from Amnesty International indicated that Taliban forces risked the safety
of their own civilian population by stationing their troops in civilian areas that
includes residential areas. 454 Amnesty International further indicated that such
measures of hiding behind the civilians would cause difficulty for the United States
and its allies from avoiding civilian causalities when raiding and specifically targeting
Taliban troops. 455 The head of the Amnesty delegation present on the Afghan border,
Carl Soderbergh stated that, “many people are reporting that the Taliban are moving
into civilian locations, with the risk of drawing enemy fire and militarizing civilian
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areas. This is quite serious.” 456 Evidently, there is the intention on part of the Taliban
forces to use the civilian population as shield. This violates all the rules, discussed in
this section and in the previous one dealing with “indiscriminate attacks”, regarding
the inviolability of civilians and the utmost protection that should be afforded to them.

4. Taking Over Hospitals for Military Purposes
Article 18 of Geneva Convention (IV) relates to the protection of hospitals to
which it states that hospitals under “no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall
at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.” 457 Furthermore,
it is noted in the commentary to this article that, “if a hospital is to enjoy special
protection under the Convention, it may under no circumstances be used for nonmedical purposes.” 458
Taking over the hospital at Kunduz by the Taliban fighters is a violation for the
protection granted to hospitals, intended solely for the care of the wounded and sick.
Regarding the incident that took place at Kunduz and in relation to Article 19 of
Geneva Convention (IV) 459 dealing with the discontinuance of protections of
hospitals, the United States and its allies acted in accordance with this provision.
When the Taliban fighters took over the hospital at Kunduz for strategic purposes
and began to use it to launch military attacks on the United States and its allies, the
United States responded in this situation inconformity with its obligation under
international humanitarian law. Knowing that the hospital was being used for
belligerent acts, there was still the possibility that within it there would be wounded
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and sick from the armed forces who qualify as hors de combat

460

or those who no

longer are part of the armed conflict, by reason of sickness, wounds, detention or so
forth and therefore protected by the Geneva Conventions. 461 Article 19 of Geneva
Convention (IV) puts on the adversary state the obligation not to attack hospitals
unless they issue a warning with a reasonable time limit to the other party. 462 In
accordance with its obligation the United States issued a warning that it will attack
and gave the forces in the hospital a time limit of two days. The wounded and sick
were evacuated from the hospital, and it was then that the United States and its allies
attacked the hospital and therefore ensuring to not violate their obligation under
international humanitarian law.
The special protection afforded to civilian hospitals under Article 19 of Geneva
Convention (IV), 463 would cease under certain conditions, if the hospitals were “used
to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.” 464 In the
Kupreskic case, the ICTY looks at the ceasing of protection to hospitals and further
refers to the article above giving an example of a non-humanitarian duties consisting
of “if an artillery post is set up on top of the hospital.” 465
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CHAPTER IV: Remedies Due as a Consequence to Violations of International
Law
The following chapter will assess the possible remedies that may be relevant. The
conflict being an ongoing one adds to the complexity of this thesis. However, possible
redress to violations of international humanitarian law in future conflicts with the
establishment of the International Criminal Court will be briefly examined.
State responsibility arises when a State commits an international wrongful act. 466
In order to establish that there is an international wrongful act of a State, whether it is
an action of that State or an omission, there are two main elements that have to be
sufficed. 467 First, that the act or omission is attributed to the State under international
law and second that this act or omission constitutes a breach of the State’s
international obligation. 468 A State that is aggrieved by such a breach has different
ways to obtain remedy, notably by bringing action against the responsible State before
the International Court of Justice to obtain reparations.

A. General Remedies for States Under International Law
Reparations are due when a State has committed an international wrongful act. 469
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case stated “it is
a principle of international law, and even a greater conception of law, that any breach
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of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparations.” 470 This was
subsequently recognized as a rule of customary international law “every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
state.” 471 Article 1 of the Draft Articles of State Responsibility reiterates the existence
of this general rule.
The Court further outlined the basic principle regarding the question of
reparations. It stated that reparations, which are recognized through international
practice and arbitration tribunals, “must, so far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” 472 The purpose of
reparations is therefore to eliminate all injury caused by an illegal act of one State
towards another, given that the former was responsible for the illegal act. 473
Therefore, a State is responsible to make the necessary reparations for violations of its
international obligation.
Professor Ian Brownlie stated that one of the “sources analogous to the writings of
publicists, and at least as authoritative, are the draft articles produced by the
International Law Commission…” 474 Theodor Meron further illustrates that the work
of the International Law Commission should not only be seen as manifesting the
writings of publicists but that “it constitutes a stage in the UN work of codification
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and progressive development of international law and as such it may demonstrate
practice of states and of international organizations.” 475
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility deal
with remedies in its Chapter II titled ‘Reparation for injury’. 476 Just before this chapter
is Article 31 of the draft, stating that the State responsible for the illegal act is
obligated to “make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act.” 477 It further clarifies what constitutes injury by saying that it “includes
any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of
a State.” 478 The formulation of such an obligation in this article illustrates that
reparations are not the right of the State injured but rather an obligation of the State
responsible as a result of its breach. 479 As observed reference is made to both material,
that which can be assessed financially, and moral damage. The forms of reparation for
such damages are dealt with in Chapter II of the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, introduced above, titled ‘Reparation for Injury’.
In the 2001 Report of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility
further illustration is perceived regarding the question of the necessity of a material
damage to exist for reparations to be made. Where the Commission is of the opinion
that there is no general requirement that material damage has to exist for a State to
seek a form of reparations. The Commission cited to the Rainbow Warrior arbitration,
where it took notice of the original arguments of one of the parties that for a State to
be liable to make reparation, damage has to have existed. But it was later agreed to
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that “unlawful action against non-material interests, such as acts affecting the honor,
dignity, or prestige of a State, entitle the victim State to receive adequate reparation,
even if those acts have not resulted in a pecuniary or material loss for the claimant
State.” 480 The commission notes that the Tribunal further held that France’s breach
had “provoked indignation and public outrage in New Zealand and caused a new,
additional non-material damage… of a moral, political and legal nature, resulting
from the affront to the dignity and prestige not only of New Zealand as such, but of its
highest judicial and executive authorities as well.” 481
The different forms of reparations are outlined in Article 34, under Chapter II, that
includes one or all of the following: restitution, compensation and satisfaction. Those
forms combined together or alone are for the full reparation for the injury that was
caused by the wrongful act of one State towards the other. For example, damage was
found to be a material one in the Factory at Chorzow case where the Court dealt with
restitution and compensation, as the only two forms of reparation possibly due. 482
Therefore depending on the injury caused, the type of reparations due are assessed.
Restitution for example is not enough if material damage has been caused and
therefore monetary compensation is due. 483 Restitution though cannot give the State
injured more than what it would be entitled to if the violating State has performed its
obligation. 484 In all different forms of reparation, the issue of proportionality is
crucial. Thus, the 2001 Report of the International Law Commission on State
Responsibility briefly illustrates the proportionality element by stating:
Thus restitution is excluded if it would involve a burden out of all
proportion to the benefit gained by the injured State or other party.
Compensation is limited to damage actually suffered as a result of the
480
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internationally wrongful act, and excludes damage which is indirect or
remote. Satisfaction must ‘not be out of proportion to the injury’ 485 .486
Therefore, the issue of proportionality is taken into consideration in the different
forms of reparations under Article 34 of the draft. Where reparations are aimed to be
proportional to the injury caused.
When considering the possib le forms of reparation that could be due as a
consequence to the conflict in Afghanistan, the most relevant one under this category
is reparation to States, mainly concerning the possible remedies due to Afghanistan by
the United States. This directly relates to the prohibition of the use of force, and as
this thesis attempted to show that the use of force in this instance by the United States
is a violation of international law, as it is not justified as a measure of self-defense.
The first and primary remedy that is due is the need for a State to refrain from
continuing the violation. By establishing that the use of force by the United States is a
violation of international law, the United States should end its use of force.
Following is theoretically the possible forms of remedies that are due when a State
has committed an international wrongful act towards another State. With the conflict
at hand this would relate to the possible remedies that the United States is obligated to
make for its illegal use of force on another State, Afghanistan.

1. Restitution
Restitution as a form of reparation is dealt with in Article 35 of the ILC Draft
Articles on State Responsibility. The aim behind this form of reparations is “to reestablish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed.” 487
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Those would concern for example the returning of different types of property that was
seized wrongly or of individuals detained in a wrongful manner and so forth.
Therefore the changes that took place would have to be traced to the act by the
violating State. 488 Concerned with the issue at hand, restitution is one of the most
difficult forms of reparation to determine regarding the illegal use of force or the
consequent violations of humanitarian norms during the conduct of hostilities or after
the end of hostilities, dealing with the issue of prisoners of war at Guantanamo Bay.
However, in the ranking of the different forms of reparations, restitution comes
first. This could also be seen in the decision of the Court in the Factory at Chorzow
case where the State responsible for the injury is obligated “to restore the
undertakings and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the
indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has
become impossible,” 489 adding further in reference to the case that “the impossibility,
on which the Parties are agreed, of restoring the Chorzow factory could therefore have
no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value of the undertaking for
restitution.” 490 Therefore, compensation is only considered when there is a conclusion
that restitution cannot be granted. 491
Reference to restitution in Article 35 “has a broad meaning, encompassing any
action that needs to be taken by the responsible State to restore the situation resulting
from its internationally wrongful act.” 492 It is therefore, that its importance as the first
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form of reparation is due to the fact that the breached obligation has a ‘continuing
character’. 493
As pointed out above regarding the complexity of the situation in this case, it is
possible that restitution cannot be afforded, by the responsible State, since the
situation present cannot be restored back to the original status quo. 494 However, if for
example the United States offer to rebuild Afghanistan still stands, then one might
wrongfully view this as a form of restitution on part of the United States. However,
reparations in its different forms, restitution being one of them, are due when a State
has committed an international wrongful act. In this case, the United States does not
recognize that it has been acting illegal; on the contrary it claims that it is justified in
its action. Therefore, the responsible State for the wrongful act does not recognize that
it acted illegally and thus, it does not intentionally build up the country that it raided
and bombed as an act of restitution for the wrongful act it committed. Rather, the
assistance that the United States is willing to provide regarding helping with the
rebuilding of Afghanistan, is one of its own will and is not viewed as an obligation
incumbent upon them as a result of a breach of an international obligation.
Regarding the issue of the prisoners of war and the violation of their protected
rights under the Geneva Conventions, it could be argued that their transfer back to
their respective countries is a restitution mean for the injury caused, that of violating
their right to have their status determined by a tribunal under Article 5 of the Geneva
Convention (III). However, if restitution is deemed impossible because of the nature
of the injury and the effects it had, compensation should be looked at next.
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2. Compensation
As pointed out earlier on, compensation is considered when restitution cannot be
fulfilled. Article 36 (1) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility clearly points
this out by stating “…insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.” 495 The
damage would also include any moral or material damage as outlined in the
discussion of Article 31 above. However, as laid down by Article 36 (2) only
“financial assessable damage” shall be compensated. Therefore this is “intended to
exclude compensation for what is sometimes referred to as ‘moral damage’ to a State,
i.e., the affront or injury caused by a violation of rights not associated with actual
damage to property or persons,” 496 which is what Article 37 concerning satisfaction
deals with.
In the decisions of the International Court of Justice, of the different forms of
reparations, compensation is what commonly is sought for. 497 The Court declared in
the Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project:
It is a well-established rule of international law that an injured State is
entitled to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an
internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it…. the Court
has concluded that both Parties committed internationally wrongful
acts, and it has noted that those acts gave rise to the damage sustained
by the Parties; consequently, Hungary and Slovakia are both under an
obligation to pay compensation and are both entitled to obtain
compensation. 498
However, it is important to point out that compensation in this aspect, as
illustrated, has to be assessable and therefore, it is not regarded as means of punishing
the responsible State. Moreover, international courts do not award punitive
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damages. 499 Another well-established principle is that international courts, that
already have jurisdiction regarding claims of State responsibility, as part of this
jurisdiction has also “the power to award compensation for damages suffered.” 500
Applying this to the situation at hand, compensation could only be possible if for
example, a company or maybe a Red Cross compound was bombarded by one of the
parties to the conflict. The responsible State would then be required to pay
compensation for the damages it caused, bearing in mind that the facility was not used
to conduct military operations. Compensation is also possible for moral damages. And
thus, for example the families of the journalists who were killed by the then
representative of Afghanistan, the Taliban government, could be entitled to receive
compensation. Furthermore, civilians whose houses and belongings were bombarded,
by the United States and its allies, would be entitled to monetary compensation. The
prisoners of war would further be entitled to compensation for the violation of their
right to due process.
The offer made by the United States that it is committed to assist in the
restructuring of Afghanistan included what the U.S. President referred to that,
The United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation will
provide an additional $50 million line of credit for Afghanistan to
finance private sector projects. This announcement builds on the
United States’ pledge in Tokyo earlier this month to provide $297
million this year to create jobs and to start rebuilding Afghanistan’s
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agricultural sector, its health care system, and its educational system.
Yet these efforts are only the beginning… 501
Again, this commitment could wrongfully be seen as a form of compensation.
However, the United States does not recognize that it acted illegally and thus the
intention of this commitment is not compensation to an illegal act, but that of
assistance to a new regional friend.

3. Just Satisfaction
The last form of reparation available, in the wording of Article 34, is that of
satisfaction which is only required if the other two forms did not provide for the full
reparation for the damage caused. 502 The ways in which satisfaction may be carried
out is outlined in Article 37 (2) stating that it “may consist in an acknowledgement of
the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate
modality.” 503
While as pointed above that compensation is for damages financially assessable,
satisfaction is due for those kinds of damages that cannot be assessed financially. This
kind of remedy was dealt with in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration where the tribunal
was of the opinion that:
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There is a long established practice of States and international Courts
and Tribunals of using satisfaction as a remedy or form of reparation
(in the wide sense) for the breach of an international obligation. This
practice relates particularly to the case of moral or legal damage done
directly to the State, especially as opposed to the case of damage to
persons involving international responsibilities. 504
The violation of sovereignty or territorial integrity, as what occurred in the Rainbow
Warrior arbitration, is an example where satisfaction is due since there was a nonmaterial injury by the responsible State towards the injured State. 505
One of the forms of satisfaction that could be made is a declaratory judgment by a
competent tribunal or court. The International Court of Justice emphasized this in the
Corfu Channel case by stating “to ensure respect for international law, of which it is
the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a
violation of Albanian sovereignty. This declaration is in accordance with the request
made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in itself appropriate satisfaction.” 506
This declaration came after the Court found that the ‘mine-sweeping operation’ by the
British Navy that took place after the explosion, was unlawful. 507
Another form of satisfaction is that of an apology or the expression of regret of the
responsible State towards the injured State. In the Rainbow Warrior arbitration an
apology was required, while it was further offered in different cases such as the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 508 case and the LeGrand 509 case.
Since currently the issue dealt with is not considered in an international court or
tribunal, the reparations under this form, mainly satisfaction, could be expressed by a
formal apology or expression of regret for injuries that are not assessable financially.
504
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In relation to the conflict, those would include for example the ill treatment of persons
with immunity or protected persons. 510 Other kinds of incidents where an apology
would be due would be the unintentional injury caused to civilians while targeting
military objectives.

B. Remedies for Violations of jus ad bellum
In the wording of Article 31, reparations are to be made only to the injury that
resulted from the wrongful act by the State. 511 Applying this to the case at hand, it
would be in reference to the violation of the prohibition of the use of force. Since the
argument of resorting to self-defense fails to stand as outlined in Chapter I, the United
States is therefore obligated to make the necessary reparations to the injured party,
Afghanistan, the first of which is to bring to end using force.
The use of force could be argued to result in both material and moral damages.
However, as illustrated earlier, with special reference to the Rainbow Warrior
arbitration, material damage does not have to exist for reparations to be due.
Therefore, the existence of one form of damages or both would hold the responsible
State liable to make reparations for such damages incurred.
Different factors could lead to the causation of damages, where in the Corfu
Channel case both the action of a third State that laid the mines and the Albanian
action of not notifying or warning the British ships of the existence of the mines led to
the damage to the ships. 512 Dealing with reparations for concurrent causes, the 2001
Report of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility, clarifies that
509
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when a combination of factors cause an injury and “only one of which is to be
ascribed to the responsible State, international practice and the decisions of
international tribunals do not support the reduction or attenuation of reparation for
concurrent causes, except in cases of contributory fault.” 513
Consequently, in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan the argument is that if as
established earlier that the use of force as a resort to self-defense by the United States
is a violation of international law, it could be argued that the United States by
engaging in such an illegal resort to force is responsible for all the damages resulting
from its initial and continuing, till this day, use of force alongside those allies whom
fought with it. This is applied to the case at hand as an analogy to what was applied in
the Corfu Channel case, where the United Kingdom received all its claim for
reparations from Albania for failing to notify the British ships of the mines although
Albania did not plant the mines itself. 514
In this case, the resorting to the illegal use of force by the United States had led to
the involvement of its different allies who fought along its side, e.g. the United
Kingdom and the opposition (Northern Alliance), and therefore, the United States is
obligated to make reparations for all the damages caused as a consequence to its
illegal act of using force and inviting others to assist it. Those damages could be both
material and moral damages incurred on part of Afghanistan.
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C. Remedies for Violations of jus in bello or International Humanitarian Law.
There was no vision for reparation for damages in the language of specifically the
Geneva Conventions and more generally international humanitarian law. This is not
the case however with “Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV and Article 91 of
Protocol I… [in which] humanitarian instruments generally focus on rules applicable
during hostilities, not on reparation for damage.” 515 Thus, what is apparent in both
these articles is the rising liability by the violating state to pay compensation for the
damages caused, one concerning breaches of the Hague Convention, and the other
dealing with those of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. This issue was looked
upon in Theodor Meron’s book, 516 where he focuses on the possible remedies to
violations of humanitarian norms by States, and their responsibility to remedy the
situation.
However, the inclusion of a reparation clause in the Convention is not necessary
as seen in the decision of the Permanent Court in the Chorzow Factory case, where it
states that:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparations in an adequate form.
Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to
apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the
convention itself. Differences relating to reparations, which may be
due by reason of failure to apply a convention, are consequently
differences relating to its application. 517
This further highlights the generally recognized principle concerning the
consequences of an international wrongful act by a state towards another, regardless
of whether or not the convention, outlining the obligation, had clauses dealing with
reparations. Therefore, the fact that a compensation clause is lacking from the Geneva
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Conventions of 1949, this does not mean that compensation for a violation of the
provision is not due or cannot be granted. Lastly, the provisions of Hague Convention
IV were recognized to be rules of international humanitarian law, which evolved into
customary international law. 518 As mentioned, Hague Convention IV had a
compensation clause stating that, “a belligerent party which violates the provisions of
the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall
be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” 519
On a different tone, the grave breaches provisions found in Geneva Convention
(I) Articles 49, 50, 520 Geneva Convention (II) Articles 50, 51, 521 Geneva Convention
(III) Articles 129, 130, 522 and Geneva Convention (IV) Articles 146, 147, 523 puts an
obligation on States parties to enact legislation to punish perpetrators and those who
give orders for the commission of such crimes. This is another possible remedy,
where investigations or fact-finding missions would be sent to investigate the crimes
that might have taken place and holding individuals, at whatever command level they
are, liable for the grave breaches provision. In this case, it is evident that the
violations discussed on part of the United States were a result of operations carried
out by State organs with the knowledge and approval of the State. Those individuals
who gave such orders should be tried for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
where they would be criminally responsible for the orders or actions they took.
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Universal jurisdiction exists over individuals who commit or order the
commission of crimes that are grave breaches of the respective conventions, in
international armed conflicts in relation to Common Article 2 to the Geneva
Conventions. 524 In the Tadic case, there was an attempt by the trial chamber to extend
the universal jurisdiction to apply to non-international armed conflicts as well. 525
However, the appellate chamber later reversed this decision.
The grave breaches provisions indicate that there is an obligation on State parties
to the Conventions to try and prosecute those who commit grave breaches. Thus, this
obligation establishes that there is no discretion by the State on this matter but it is
responsible to ensure that the individual perpetrators of the crimes are either punished
or extradited. 526 However, universal jurisdiction over grave breaches only applies with
respect to international armed conflicts. 527 That includes violations of common Article
3 with respect to international armed conflicts. 528
Trying individuals under the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva
Conventions is not novel, but was actually applied before. For example, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 529 and the
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 530 tried individuals for crimes
against humanity and for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. In the case
Prosecutor v. Tadic,531 Tadic was found guilty of crimes against humanity and
importantly of ‘cruel treatment’ of civilians in violation of the laws and customs of
war pursuant to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. As
discussed in Chapter II, common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is considered
as a rule of customary international law. Chapter II discusses the development of
international humanitarian law. The development of humanitarian law is also seen
throughout the principles that were used by the ad-hoc tribunals that tried war
criminals, and finding them in violations of international humanitarian law principles.
As established in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunals 532 criminal
responsibility could extend to individuals regarding the perpetuation of certain types
of crimes. In this Charter, the principle of individual criminal responsibility was
established to which it also offers a definition of the three main crimes in
international law then: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 533 Those are nowadays outlined in Article 5 of the International Criminal
Court’s statute. 534 In the current situation, there are crimes to which individual
criminal responsibility could arise. Consequently, this is another form of remedy that
is possible in this situation, which is trying those in violation of international
humanitarian norms. Other precedents exist where individuals, including heads of
state and officials, have faced criminal prosecutions for crimes against humanity and
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grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The main precedent referred to are those
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Depending on what crime one is alleged to have committed and the existence of
an international armed conflict, the provisions dealing with grave breaches in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide States with universal jurisdiction. 535 In the
Tadic case, the trial chamber had attempted to extend the universal jurisdiction over
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention to non-international armed conflict. 536 It
did so by looking at Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTY, which states “the tribunal
shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to committed grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949…” 537 and further ruling that
when such grave breaches are committed, the acts may be prosecuted by the ICTY
whether or not those acts took place in an international armed conflict. 538 The trial
chamber was of the opinion that “the requirement of international conflict does not
appear on the face of Article 2…” of the ICTY Statute, and that “there is no ground
for treating Article 2 as in effect importing into the Statute the whole of the terms of
the Conventions, including the reference in common Article 2 of the Geneva
Convention[s] to international conflicts…” 539 However the appellate chamber of the
ICTY reversed the decision of the trial chamber rejecting it and its argument that
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply
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to non-international armed conflicts as well. 540 As Morris points out in her article, the
appellate chamber of the ICTY reversed the decision of the trial Court “on a very
basic question of international criminal law.” 541 She further clarifies that such issues
are still in the process of being agreed to as demonstrated in the case above. However,
the most concerning principles here is that universal jurisdiction over grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, subject that the acts were committed in an
international armed conflict, is not questioned by the before mentioned case.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 as outlined above “reinforces this universal
jurisdiction by making it a duty for states to identify, prosecute, and punish all
persons, whatever their nationality, who have committed particularly serious war
crimes (‘grave breaches’).” 542 Exercising its right to universal jurisdiction, a Belgian
Court issued an arrest warrant in April 2000 for the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Congo for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their protocols and crimes
against humanity. The latest decision by the International Court of Justice comes as a
setback for universal jurisdiction over, heads of states and those with diplomatic
immunity, whom are deemed responsible for inciting the commission of war crimes,
genocide, or crimes against humanity or even for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. 543 The Court was of the opinion that the Congolese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, whom the Belgian authorities had an arrest warrant issued for, was immune
from jurisdiction for any of the crimes he is alleged to have committed while in office.
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The Court ordered the Belgian government to cancel the arrest warrant that it had
issued on 11 April 2000.
Paragraph 60 of the decision clearly points out “that immunity from jurisdiction
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy
impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their
gravity.” 544 The following paragraph lays down four different scenarios when a
person with diplomatic immunity could face criminal prosecution (Special reference
in the case is made to ‘incumbent or former’ Minister of Foreign Affairs). The first,
they are not immune under international law in their own countries and could
therefore face prosecution under the relevant domestic laws. 545 Second, if the State
they have represented or still represent waives the immunity, then they are not
immune from foreign jurisdictions. 546 Third, after the person ceases to be in office,
he/she is not immune from foreign jurisdiction for prior or subsequent acts committed
or for those acts he/she commits while in office but in a private capacity. 547 Last, the
immunity is lost if they are subject to an International Criminal Court or tribunal
where it has jurisdiction. 548 The Court further gives examples to illustrate this last
point by pointing to the ICTR and the ICTY, both of which were established by
Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII. It also points to the prospective
International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into force, 1 July 2002 as announced
by the UN Office of Legal Affairs. 549 Special emphasis is added to Article 27(2) of
the ICC statute stating “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to
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the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 550
In the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 551
they provide a historical survey on how universal jurisdiction has been perceived by
States. They summarized the findings by stating that there exists broad treaty-based
extraterritorial jurisdiction,
[I]n addition to these were the parallel provisions whereby a State
party in whose jurisdiction the alleged perpetrator of such offences is
found, shall prosecute him or extradite him. By the loose use of
language the latter has come to be referred to as ‘universal
jurisdiction’, though this is really an obligatory territorial jurisdiction
over persons, albeit in relations to acts committed elsewhere. 552
Furthermore, although they agree that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is not
established by State practice, “this does not necessarily indicate, however, that such a
exercise would be unlawful … [where] there is equally nothing in this case law which
evidences an opinio juris on the illegality of such a jurisdiction.” 553 They further
elaborate that indications show that over certain international crimes, a universal
criminal jurisdiction is evidently not considered as unlawful, 554 “[where] the duty to
prosecute under those treaties which contain the aut dedere aut prosequi provisions
opens the door to a jurisdiction based on the heinous nature of the crimes rather than
on links of territoriality or nationality (whether as perpetrator or victim).” 555 At this
stage of their opinion they point to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which “lend
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support to this possibility, and are widely regarded as today reflecting customary
international law.” 556
Concluding, the grave breaches provisions in the Geneva Conventions which
applies, as mentioned above, to international armed conflicts “place affirmative duties
on states to suppress such breaches and to search for an extradite or prosecute
violators.” 557 It is thus that States are obligated to try or extradite individuals who are
responsible for the commission or the ordering of crimes, to which a legal regime for
such exists.

D. Future Role of the International Criminal Court
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of
universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision.
We are close to its realization. We will do our part to see it through till
the end. We ask you…to do yours in our struggle to ensure that no
ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights
with impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars and
conflict know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that
they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights will be
punished.” 558
Kofi Anan, United Nations Secretary General.
The Secretary General of the United Nations had made this statement before the
signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. His
statement reflects the outcome he had hoped for and that is an establishment of an
International Criminal Court (ICC). On 1 July 2002, the Statute of the International
Criminal Court came into force.
Neither Afghanistan nor the United States are parties to the ICC Statute. However,
in order to illustrate how the ICC could be a possible remedy for future similar
situations, let us hypothetically say that all parties to the conflict have ratified the
556
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respective Statute; and that the latter has come into force before the conflict took
place in Afghanistan.
Under the individual criminal responsibility provision in the statute of the ICC,
not only does the ICC have jurisdiction over individuals who commit the acts
punishable by the statute but also those who order or induce others to commit such
acts. 559 The Court’s jurisdiction also extends to an individual who:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which
in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime,
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission…. 560
These categories thus involve not only armed forces actually engaging in combat,
but also those who give orders, including Commanders in Chief, Defense Ministers,
or Heads of States. As outlined in Article 27(2) of the ICC statute, the Court is not
even barred from exercising its jurisdiction over persons with special immunities.
Furthermore, as pointed out in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 case, the Court
was of the opinion that immunity is lost if the individual with immunity is subject to
the jurisdiction of an international criminal Court. 561 Therefore, individuals from both
sides as well as those officials who gave the orders, including heads of State are liable
to prosecution.
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The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over all crimes generally defined in Article 5 of
its Statute. 562 This includes the most serious grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which are crimes against humanity and or war crimes.
Furthermore, “many of the customary rules and laws are now embodied in the Rome
Statute and will become enforceable when the new court comes into operation.” 563
Although the ICC has been met with opposition by many States, its existence is
essential for not only deterring the commission of future grave crimes, but for
bringing about remedies for grave violations of international humanitarian law. 564
Most important, immunities for officials of States that has prevented the exercise of
universal jurisdiction over people who are at the top of the command hierarchy will
no longer be allowed in most cases. The ICC is thus a mechanism that will enhance
world peace and security by bringing to justice those who perpetrate or order acts that
are contrary to principles of international humanitarian law.
A former Nuremberg prosecutor stated that, “there can be no peace without
justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what
is just and lawful under any given circumstances.” 565 As demonstrated in this thesis,
the law that governs the conduct of wars and the protection to be afforded to
individuals already exists. It is its enforcement that remains weak. The ICC is seen to
have “brought enforcement to international criminal law and international
humanitarian law,” and “while we have numerous rules and laws protecting civilians,
regulating the treatment of prisoners and prohibiting the use of certain weapons and
instruments, they have rarely been enforced and violators have hardly been
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punished.” 566 The ICC is seen as a possible effective remedy to future conflicts, if not
to some of the alleged violations that took place throughout the course of the war in
Afghanistan, as discussed above.
The ICC would apply the principle of complementary, where the jurisdiction of
the ICC is only applicable when a State is unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction
over a certain case involving an individual accused of committing a crime. 567 The ICC
would therefore serve as a basis to encourage national courts and tribunals to exercise
jurisdiction, to which they have the priority to exercise jurisdiction over the ICC.568
Applying this to the situation at hand, States are encouraged to try and punish those
individuals who have committed crimes in breach of the Geneva Conventions, and
international humanitarian law in general. If States fail or are not able to do so, then
the ICC could have jurisdiction to deal with such violations. In the present conflict in
Afghanistan, since the principle of non-retroactivity is included in the ICC statute, the
jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes committed in the conflict before July 1, 2002 does
not hold. However, crimes that are committed and continue to take place after July 1,
2002 fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, the Security Council is
given the right to refer cases to the ICC. Due to the nature of the composition of the
Security Council, and the veto power of the United States, which is a party to this
conflict, this process will not be possible if American soldiers or any soldiers from the
allied forces are subject to proceedings for committing or ordering the commission of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
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CONCLUSION

“From now on, all potential warlords must know that, depending on
how a conflict develops there might be established an international
tribunal before which those will be brought who violate the laws of
war and humanitarian law… Everyone must now be presumed to know
the contents of the most basic provisions of international criminal law;
the defence that the suspects were not aware of the law will not be
permissible.” 569
Hans Corell, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Legal
Affairs.
The conflict in Afghanistan is still ongoing and violations of international law
continue to take place. However, this thesis is fixed to the time period of the
respective violations discussed in Chapters I and III. The discussion above has argued
that the use of force by the United States and the consequences of such use of force
constituted violations of international law.
As indicated in Chapter I of the thesis, and in line with the available evidence, 570
the use of force by the United States against Afghanistan is not justified as means of
self-defense. In Chapter VI, State responsibility was touched upon, where such a
responsibility arises when an international wrongful act is committed by a State. The
act has to be attributed to the State and constitute a breach of its international
obligation. 571 Once this is determined, reparations are due by the State that committed
the international wrongful act. 572 The use of force by the United States against
Afghanistan is attributed to the United States; it also constitutes a violation of its
569
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international obligation. The United States is internationally responsible for violating
the prohibition on the use of force, required by its treaty obligations and customary
international law. Since the conflict did not cease to exist, the United States continues
till today to be liable for the use of force, and its consequences, it had instituted
against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Reparations on part of the United States are
thus due to Afghanistan for the illegal use of force, which is the international
wrongful act committed by the United States. The first form of reparations that is due
is for the United States to cease from continuing the use of force. Furthermore, trying
individuals responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions is due.
It is unfortunate that the Conventions applicable during armed conflicts lack
effective enforcement mechanisms to deter and punish individuals committing crimes
within the scope of those Conventions. As illustrated in this thesis the international
community has attempted to address such crimes by the Security Council establishing
the ICTY and the ICTR. With the ICC becoming a reality on 1 July 2002, crimes that
take place after this date may also be punishable by a court. Therefore, the
continuation of violations of humanitarian law, with specific reference to crimes
against humanity and war crimes will become an issue if one of the parties to the
conflict ratifies the Court’s Statute.
One of the countries with the major amount of forces in Afghanistan after the
United States, the United Kingdom, is party to the Statute of the ICC since it
submitted its ratification 4 October 2001. Article 12 of the ICC statute extends the
jurisdiction of the court to non-state parties. This is seen where the court would have
jurisdiction over crimes that are committed a) over the territory of a state party b) or
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the person accused being a national of a state party. 573 In the first instance, if for
example Afghanistan accepts the jurisdiction of the Court within the context of
Article 12(3) 574 or becomes a state party to the statute, then any violation of the
crimes punishable by the Court that occurs on its territory could be brought forward
to the Court, whether or not the State, whom the individual who committed the act
belongs to, ratified or even consented to such a jurisdiction.
The effectiveness of the ICC in punishing individuals responsible for the
commission or ordering for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity
remains to be seen. 575 The definition of the crime of aggression, as outlined above, is
crucial by which States could be held liable for committing a crime of aggression.
This would be an unprecedented step that an international court will have the ultimate
jurisdiction in determining whether or not a State is committing aggression. However,
how States will define the crime of aggression remains to be seen in the coming years.
Although the ICC will only deal with crimes that are committed after its entry into
force in accordance with Article 11, 576 the ICC will be a reminder to heads of States,
military commanders, officers and individuals that none of them is immune from
prosecution, for their actions. It is the hope that the ICC will serve as deterrence for
the commission of future violations, 577 and as a mean of remedy. In the context of this
conflict, the ICC, in theory, could still deal with cases regarding individuals
responsible for the commission of crimes under which the ICC has jurisdiction over,
if the Security Council refers the matter to the ICC. However, with the veto power of
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the United States this would not be possible. Furthermore, crimes that took place after
1 July 2002 or continues to take place after that date fall within the jurisdiction of the
court. Thus, ideally now that the ICC is a reality, members of the allied forces,
including the United Kingdom, who are party to the ICC Statute as well, could refer
the cases of the Guantanamo prisoners to the ICC.578 In addition, the Security Council
could make such a referral, however since it is subject to a veto; it would “be difficult
in view of the likely U.S. position in the Council.” 579 Such a referral would be with
the presumption that some of those detained could be charged with crimes against
humanity or war crimes. 580 In reference to the international character of the situation
“it would seem best for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Such trials
by the ICC would demonstrate the spirit of coalition, give international legitimacy,
and avoid criticism about below-the-standards military tribunals.” 581
Finally, as envisioned by Cherif Bassiouni, we witnessed the entry into force of
the ICC statute and later setting up of the ICC. An excerpt of Bassiouni’s speech at
the Rome Ceremony on July 18, 1998, states the fundamental reasons for the
establishment of the ICC and what it can do for the generations yet to come. He
addressed the world leaders and communities by the following:
The ICC reminds governments that realpolitik, which sacrifices
justice at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted. It
asserts that impunity for the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes is no longer tolerated. In that respect it
fulfills what Prophet Mohammad said, that ‘wrongs must be righted’.
It affirms that justice is an integral part of peace and thus reflects what
Pope Paul VI once said, “If you want peace, work for justice”. These
values are clearly reflected in the ICC’s Preamble.
The ICC will not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind. It will
not eliminate conflicts, nor return victims to life, or restore survivors
to their prior conditions of well-being and it will not bring all
perpetrators of major crimes to justice. But it can help avoid some
578
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conflicts, prevent some victimization, and bring to justice some of the
perpetrators of these crimes. In so doing, the ICC will strengthen
world order and contribute to world peace and security. As such, the
ICC, like other international and national legal institutions, will add its
contribution to the humanization of our civilization. 582
The ICC is seen in this context to be the true representation of remedies of
violations of international humanitarian law. While such violations have been dealt
with in the International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua case for example, it still
does not serve the ultimate purpose of eradicating the commission of heinous crimes
during armed conflicts. Again, with the far reach that the ICC will have, especially
over individuals, it will have a stronger reminder to parties involved in armed
conflicts.
This thesis has attempted to describe the application of international humanitarian
law to the international armed conflict; specifically, its application to the recent
conflict in Afghanistan, and the possibility of remedies that could be due. Under the
existing international regime, such remedies could be sought upon the agreement of
the parties to the conflict. The author is of the opinion, that the most effective mean of
remedy available is the establishment of a similar tribunal, that of the ICTY and the
ICTR, to try and punish individuals, however high up in the chain of command, who
were involved in committing or the order of commission, of violations addressed in
Chapter III. However, notice should be made to the fact that those tribunals were
established by Security Council resolutions. One of the parties to the conflict that this
thesis has addressed is a permanent member of the Security Council with a right to
veto. Thus, the establishment of the ICC is crucial, as it will be a Court functioning to
deal with the crimes it has jurisdiction over, not for a specific conflict, but for all
conflicts. It is the hope that this will end the impunity of superpowers.
582
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APPENDIX A: Excerpts from the UN Charter
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
(3) To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
(4) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Article 2(3)
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
Article 2(4)
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
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rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace
and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council,on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security
Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security
Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not
represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43,
invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council
concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action.
The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be
determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43,
by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
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Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of
the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all
questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international
peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of
armaments, and possible disarmament.
The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the
Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently
represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the
efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its
work.
The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction
of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command
of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation
with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.
Article 48
The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of
them, as the Security Council may determine. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of
the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which
they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the
measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
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measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.
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APPENDIX B: Table showing the development of international humanitarian
law instruments since 1864
This table is taken word by word from the following source (between brackets are the inclusion of the
author of this thesis):
M ARCO SASSOLI & A NTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 101-104 (1999).

Development of International Humanitarian Law
3000 [BC] Customs, Bilateral treaties, Customary law [also included are customs derived from the
Asian, African, and Islamic context described in Chapter II].
1859

Henry Dunant assists the wounded on the battlefield of Solferino

1863

Lieber Code (Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in Field)

1863

Foundation of the ICRC and the first National Societies

1864

First Geneva Convention

1868

Saint Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive
Projectiles

1880

Oxford Manual on The Laws of War on Land

1899/1907 Hague Conventions
1913

Oxford Manual of the Laws of Naval War

First World War
1925

Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

1929

First Geneva Convention on prisoners of war

[1928-1929 Pact of Paris (Kellogg Briand Pact) that outlawed the use of force as an instrument of
foreign policy and has a significant impact on the movement to restrict States’ ability to wage
war without limitations].
Second World War
1945/1948

Establishment of the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo for the

Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
1949

Geneva Conventions:
I on Wounded and Sick in the Field
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II on Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea
III on Prisoners of War
IV on Civilians (in the hands of the enemy)
Common Article 3 on non-international armed conflicts
1954

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

Decolonisation, guerilla wars
1977

Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions

Protocol I: applicable in international armed conflicts (including national
liberation wars)
Contents:

-

Development of the 1949 rules

-

Adaptation of International Humanitarian Law to the realities of guerrilla warfare

-

Protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities

-

Rules on the conduct of hostilities

Protocol II: applicable to non-international armed conflicts
Contents:

-

Extension and more precise formulation of the fundamental guarantees protection all

those who do not or no longer actively participate in hostilities
-

Protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities

1980

UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

1993

Paris Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction

Ethnic cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda
1993/1994

Establishment of International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (in The

Hague) and Rwanda (in Arusha)
1995/96 Protocols to the 1980 Weapons Convention
-

Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons

-

New Protocol II on Anti-Personnel Land Mines

1997

Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Land Mines

1998

Adoption in Rome of the Statute of the International Criminal Court
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APPENDIX C: Diagram showing prison cells at Camp X-Ray
BBC News, Prison Camp Pictures Spark Protests (Jan. 20, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1771000/1771687.stm.

Note: This is how the cells looked like until April 2002, the prisoners have moved since then to
more permanent facilities (in Camp Delta), that arguably provide for more humane conditions.

153

APPENDIX D: Common Articles 2 + 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 &
(Common Article 63, 62, 142, 158 in their respective order)
Article 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who
are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound
by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its
services to the Parties to the conflict.
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The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
Article 63 (GCI), 62 (GCII), 142 (GCIII), 158 (GCIV)
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the
Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the Swiss
Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the
denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and
until after operations connected with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the present
Convention have been terminated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair
the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
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APPENDIX E: Excerpts from Geneva Convention (I)
Article 49
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which
shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Article 50
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
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APPENDIX F: Excerpts from Geneva Convention (II)
Article 50
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be comrnitted, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which
shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Article 51
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
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APPENDIX G: Excerpts from Geneva Convention (III)
Article 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer
corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized
resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own
territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including
such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian
members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or
of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received
authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose
with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews
of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under
any other provisions of international law.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up
arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units,
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying
Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally
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liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such
persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which
are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to
internment.
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been
received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to
intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers
may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126
and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or nonbelligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic
relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform
towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without
prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and
consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in
Article 33 of the present Convention.
Article 5
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into
the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into
the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.
Article 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining
Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is
prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no
prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any
kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and
carried out in his interest.
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Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or
intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are
prohibited.
Article 14
Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as
favourable as that granted to men.
Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The
Detaining Power may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights
such capacity confers except in so far as the captivity requires.
Article 17
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names
and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent
information.
If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded
to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to
become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army,
regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card
may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well,
any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its
armed forces. AS far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate.
The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken
away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be
threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity,
shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all
possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
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The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
Article 20
The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions similar to those
for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and
potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take
all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during evacuation, and shall establish as soon as possible
a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated.
If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through transit camps, their stay in such camps shall
be as brief as possible.
Article 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of
hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners
themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be
removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their
nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of
war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except
with their consent.
Article 25
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the
habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both
total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be entirely
protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out.
All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.

161

In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate
dormitories shall be provided for them.
Article 87
Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the Detaining Power to
any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of the said Power
who have committed the same acts.
When fixing the penalty, the courts or authorities of the Detaining Power shall take into consideration,
to the widest extent possible, the fact that the accused, not being a national of the Detaining Power, is
not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances
independent of his own will. The said courts or authorities shall be at liberty to reduce the penalty
provided for the violation of which the prisoner of war is accused, and shall therefore not be bound to
apply the minimum penalty prescribed.
Collective punishment for individual acts, corporal punishments, imprisonment in premises without
daylight and, in general, any form of torture or cruelty, are forbidden.
No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the Detaining Power, or prevented from wearing his
badges.
Article 89
The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:
1. A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner
of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more
than thirty days.
2. Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present
Convention.
3. Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
4. Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers. In no case shall disciplinary
punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.
Article 118
Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
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In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the
conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining
Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the
principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between the
Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be carried out
on the following basis:
(a) If the two Powers are contigu ou s , the Power on wh ich the prisoners of war depend shall bear the
costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport of
prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to the
territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties concerned shall agree between
themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation. The conclusion
of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
Article 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which
shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the present
Convention.
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Article 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
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APPENDIX H: Excerpts from Geneva Convention (IV)
Article 4
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever,
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a
neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent
State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13.
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
August 12, 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present
Convention.
Article 18
Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may
in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the
Parties to the conflict.
States which are Parties to a conflict shall provide all civilian hospitals with certificates showing that
they are civilian hospitals and that the buildings which they occupy are not used for any purpose which
would deprive these hospitals of protection in accordance with Article 19.
Civilian hospitals shall be marked by means of the emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field of August 12, 1949, but only if so authorized by the State.
The Parties to the conflict shall, in so far as military considerations permit, take the necessary steps to
make the distinctive emblems indicating civilian hospitals clearly visible to the enemy land, air and
naval forces in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile action.
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In view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed by being close to military objectives, it is
recommended that such hospitals be situated as far as possible from such objectives.
Article 19
The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit,
outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after
due warning has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit, and after such
warning has remained unheeded.
The fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces are nursed in these hospitals, or the
presence of small arms and ammunition taken from such combatants which have not yet been handed
to the proper service, shall not be considered to be acts harmful to the enemy.
Article 28
The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations.
Article 146
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which
shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Article 147
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing,
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torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention,
taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
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APPENDIX I: Excerpts from Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
Article 1-General principles and scope of application
(3) This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of
war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.
Article 48-Basic rule
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties
to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.
Article 49-Definition of attacks and scope of application
1. "Attacks" means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.
2. The provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in whatever territory
conducted, including the national territory belonging to a Party to the conflict but under the control of
an adverse Party.
3. The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the
sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.
4. The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning humanitarian protection
contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly in Part II thereof, and in other international
agreements binding upon the High Contracting Parties, as well as to other rules of international law
relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air against the effects
of hostilities.
Article 51-Protection of the civilian population
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising
from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to
other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.
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3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities.
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) Those which employ a method or
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) Those which employ a
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
(a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a
number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.
7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to
render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield
military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the
conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to
attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.
8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal
obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the obligation to take the
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57.
Article 52-General protection of civilian objects
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which
are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
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contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military of advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place
of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to
military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
Article 53-Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant international instruments, it is
prohibited:
(a) To commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(b) To use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) To make such objects the object of reprisals.
Article 54-Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of
denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the
motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an
adverse Party:
(a) As sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) If not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event
shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with
such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the defence of its national
territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a
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Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control where required by imperative military
necessity.
Article 55-Protection of the natural environment
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and
severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which
are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
Article 56-Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical
generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military
objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses
among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or
installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease:
(a) For a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant
and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support;
(b) For a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, significant
and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support;
(c) For other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they
are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only
feasible way to terminate such support.
3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection
accorded them by international law, including the protection of the precautionary measures provided
for in Article 57. If the protection ceases and any of the works, installations or military objectives
mentioned in paragraph I is attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of the
dangerous forces.
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4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph
1 the object of reprisals.
5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the vicinity of
the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole
purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not
themselves be made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except for
defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or installations and that
their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected
works or installations.
6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements
among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces.
7. In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the
conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles placed
on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol. The absence of such marking in
no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article.
Article 57-Precautions in attack
(1) In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects.
(2) With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects;
(iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
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(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military
one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit.
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the
least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict shall, in
conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.
5. No provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the civilian
population, civilians or civilian objects.
Article 58-Precautions against the effects of attacks
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:
(a) Without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military
objectives;
(b) Avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas;
(c) Take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and
civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.
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APPENDIX J: Excerpts from Hague Convention (IV)
Article 3
The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case
of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.
Article 4
Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who
capture them.
They must be humanely treated.
All their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property.
Article 19
The wills of prisoners of war are received or drawn up in the same way as for soldiers of the national
army.
The same rules shall be observed regarding death certificates as well as for the burial of prisoners of
war, due regard being paid to their grade and rank.
Article 20
After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall be carried out as quickly as
possible.
Article 22
The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
Article 23
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden (a) To
employ poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence,
has surrendered at discretion;
(d) To declare that no quarter will be given; (e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(f) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform
of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention;
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(g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war;
(h) To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the
nationals of the hostile party.
A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service
before the commencement of the war.
Article 25
The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended is prohibited.
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APPENDIX K: Excerpts from ILC Draft on State Responsibility (2001)
Article 1: Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.
Article 2: Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the state under international law; and
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
Article 31: Reparation
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of
a State.
Article 34: Forms of reparation
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either single or in combination, in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter
Article 35: Restitution
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that
is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to
the extent that restitution:
(a) Is not materially impossible;
(b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of
compensation.
Article 36: Compensation
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the
damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as
it is established.

176

Article 37: Satisfaction
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction
for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation.
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal
apology or another appropriate modality.
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the
responsible State.
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APPENDIX L: Excerpts from the International Criminal Court Statute
Article 5-Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with
respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 12-Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of
the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in
accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed
on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State
may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with
respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay
or exception in accordance with Part 9.
Article 25-Individual criminal responsibility
1.

The

Court

shall

have

jurisdiction

over

natural

persons

pursuant

to

this

Statute.

2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible
and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.

178

3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person,
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where
such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a
substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's
intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit
that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility of States under international law.
Article 27-Irrelevance of official capacity
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction
of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.
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Article 75-Reparations to victims
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any
damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund
provided for in article 79.
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take account of
representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or
interested States.
4. In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a person is convicted of a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court, determine whether, in order to give effect to an order which it may make
under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93, paragraph 1.
5. A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if the provisions of article 109 were
applicable to this article.
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or
international law.
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